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Abstract Combining higher-order abstract syntax and (co)-induction in a logical frame-
work is well known to be problematic. We describe the theory and the practice of a tool
called Hybrid, within Isabelle/HOL and Coq, which aims to address many of these dif-
ficulties. It allows object logics to be represented using higher-order abstract syntax, and
reasoned about using tactical theorem proving and principles of (co)induction. Moreover,
it is definitional, which guarantees consistency within a classical type theory. The idea is
to have a de Bruijn representation of λ -terms providing a definitional layer that allows the
user to represent object languages using higher-order abstract syntax, while offering tools
for reasoning about them at the higher level. In this paper we describe how to use Hy-
brid in a multi-level reasoning fashion, similar in spirit to other systems such as Twelf and
Abella. By explicitly referencing provability in a middle layer called a specification logic,
we solve the problem of reasoning by (co)induction in the presence of non-stratifiable hy-
pothetical judgments, which allow very elegant and succinct specifications of object logic
inference rules. We first demonstrate the method on a simple example, formally proving
type soundness (subject reduction) for a fragment of a pure functional language, using a
minimal intuitionistic logic as the specification logic. We then prove an analogous result
for a continuation-machine presentation of the operational semantics of the same language,
encoded this time in an ordered linear logic that serves as the specification layer. This exam-
ple demonstrates the ease with which we can incorporate new specification logics, and also
illustrates a significantly more complex object logic whose encoding is elegantly expressed
using features of the new specification logic.
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1 Introduction
Logical frameworks provide general languages in which it is possible to represent a wide
variety of logics, programming languages, and other formal systems. They are designed to
capture uniformities of the deductive systems of these object logics and to provide support
for implementing and reasoning about them. One application of particular interest of such
frameworks is the specification of programming languages and the formalization of their
semantics in view of formal reasoning about important properties of these languages, such
as their soundness. Programming languages that enjoy such properties provide a solid basis
for building software systems that avoid a variety of harmful defects, leading to systems that
are significantly more reliable and trustworthy.
The mechanism by which object-logics are represented in a logical framework has a
paramount importance on the success of a formalization. A naive choice of representation
can seriously endanger a project almost from the start, making it almost impossible to move
beyond the very first step of the developments of a case study (see [71], which barely goes
beyond encoding the syntax of the pi-calculus).
Higher-Order Abstract Syntax (HOAS) is a representation technique used in some logi-
cal frameworks. Using HOAS, whose idea dates back to Church [24], binding constructs
in an object logic are encoded within the function space provided by a meta-language
based on a λ -calculus. For example, consider encoding a simple functional programming
language such as Mini-ML [26] in a typed meta-language, where object-level programs
are represented as meta-level terms of type expr. We can introduce a constant fun of type
(expr → expr)→ expr to represent functions of one argument. Using such a representation
allows us to delegate to the meta-language α-conversion and capture-avoiding substitution.
Further, object logic substitution can be rendered as meta-level β -conversion. However, ex-
periments such as the one reported in [79] suggest that the full benefits of HOAS can be
enjoyed only when the latter is paired with support for hypothetical and parametric judg-
ments [51, 66, 90]. Such judgments are used, for example, in the well-known encoding of
inference rules assigning simple types to Mini-ML programs. Both the encoding of pro-
grams and the encoding of the typing predicate typically contain negative occurrences of
the type or predicate being defined (e.g., the underlined occurrence of expr in the type of
fun above). This rules out any naive approach to view those set-theoretically as least fixed
points [49,89] or type-theoretically as inductive types, which employ strict positivity [88] to
enforce strong normalization. As much as HOAS sounds appealing, it raises the question(s):
how are we going to reason about such encodings, in particular are there induction and case
analysis principles available?
Among the many proposals—that we will survey in Section 6—one solution that has
emerged in the last decade stands out: specification and (inductive) meta-reasoning should
be handled within a single system but at different levels. The first example of such a meta-
logic was FOλ ∆ IN [69], soon to be followed by its successor, Linc [109].1 They are both
1 This is by no way the end of the story; on the contrary, the development of these ambient logics is very
much a work in progress: Tiu [110] introduced the system LGω to get rid of the local signatures required by
Linc’s ∇ quantifier. Even more recently Gacek, Miller & Nadathur presented the logic G to ease reasoning
on open terms and implemented it in the Abella system [42–44]. However, as this overdue report of our
approach describes with an undeniable tardiness a system that was developed before the aforementioned new
3based on intuitionistic logic augmented with introduction and elimination rules for defined
atoms (partial inductive definitions, PIDs [50]), in particular definitional reflection (defL),
which provides support for case analysis. While FOλ ∆ IN has only induction on natural
numbers as the primitive form of inductive reasoning, the latter generalizes that to stan-
dard forms of induction and co-induction [82]; Linc also introduces the so-called “nabla”
quantifier ∇ [76] to deal with parametric judgments. This quantifier accounts for the dual
properties of eigenvariables, namely freshness (when viewed as constants introduced by the
quantifier right rule) and instantiability as a consequence of the left rule and case analysis.
Consistency and viability of proof search are ensured by cut-elimination [68, 109]. Inside
the meta-language, a specification logic (SL) is developed that is in turn used to specify
and (inductively) reason about the object logic/language (OL) under study. This partition
avoids the issue of inductive meta-reasoning in the presence of negative occurrences in OL
judgments, since hypothetical judgments are intensionally read in terms of object-level prov-
ability. The price to pay is coping with this additional layer where we explicitly reference the
latter. Were we to work with only a bare proof-checker, this price could be indeed deemed
too high; however, if we could rely on some form of automation such as tactical theorem
proving, the picture would be significantly different.
The first author has proposed in [36] that, rather than implementing an interactive theo-
rem prover for such meta-logics from scratch, they can be simulated within a modern proof
assistant. (Coq [14] in that case.) The correspondence is roughly as follows: the ambient
logic of the proof assistant in place of the basic (logical) inference rules of FOλ ∆ IN , intro-
duction and elimination (inversion) rules of inductive types (definitions) in place of the defR
and defL rules of PIDs.2 Both approaches introduce a minimal sequent calculus [59] as a SL,
and a Prolog-like set of clauses for the OL. Nevertheless, in a traditional inductive setting,
this is not quite enough, as reasoning by inversion crucially depends on simplifying in the
presence of constructors. When such constructors are non-inductive, which is typically the
case with variable-binding operators, this presents a serious problem. The approach used in
that work was axiomatic: encode the HOAS signature with a set of constants and add a set
of axioms stating the freeness and extensionality properties of the constants. With the criti-
cal use of those axioms, it was shown that it is possible to replicate, in the well-understood
and interactive setting of Coq, the style of proofs typical of FOλ ∆ IN . In particular, subject
reduction for Mini-ML is formalized in [36] following this style very closely; this means
that the theorem is proved immediately without any “technical” lemmas required by the
choice of encoding technique or results that may be trivial but are intrinsically foreign to the
mathematics of the problem. Moreover, HOAS proofs of subject reduction typically do not
require weakening or substitutions lemmas, as they are implicit in the higher-order nature of
the encoding. However, this approach did not offer any formal justification to the axiomatic
approach and it is better seen as a proof-of-concept more than foundational work.
The Hybrid tool [3] was developed around the same time: it implements a higher-order
meta-language within Isabelle/HOL [84] that provides a form of HOAS for the user to repre-
sent OLs. The user level is separated from the infrastructure, in which HOAS is implemented
definitionally via a de Bruijn style encoding. Lemmas stating properties such as freeness and
extensionality of constructors are proved and no additional axioms are required.
contributions, we will take the liberty to refer to Linc as the “canonical” two-level system. We will discuss
new developments in more depth in Section 6.1.
2 The defL rule for PIDs may use full higher-order unification, while inversion in an inductive proof as-
sistant typically generates equations that may or may not be further simplified, especially at higher-order
types.
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Fig. 1 Architecture of the Hybrid system
It was therefore natural to combine the HOAS meta-language provided by Hybrid with
Miller & McDowell’s two-level approach, modified for inductive proof assistants. We im-
plement this combined architecture in both Isabelle/HOL and Coq, but we speculate that
the approach also works for other tactic-based inductive proof assistants, such as PVS [87],
LEGO [62] etc. We describe mainly the Isabelle/HOL version here, though we compare it
in some detail with the Coq implementation.3 A graphical depiction of the architecture is
shown in Figure 1. We often refer to the Hybrid and Isabelle/HOL levels together as the
meta-logic. When we need to distinguish the Isabelle/HOL level on its own, we call it the
meta-meta-logic. When we say two-level reasoning, we are referring to the object and spec-
ification levels, to emphasize that there are two separate reasoning levels in addition to the
meta-level.
Moreover, we suggest a further departure in design (Section 4.4) from the original two-
level approach [69]: when possible, i.e., when the structural properties of the meta-logic are
coherent with the style of encoding of the OL, we may reserve for the specification level
only those judgments that cannot be adequately encoded inductively and leave the rest at the
Isabelle/HOL level. We claim that this framework with or without this variation has several
advantages:
– The system is more trustworthy: freeness of constructors and, more importantly, exten-
sionality properties at higher-order types are not assumed, but proved via the related
properties of the infrastructure, as we show in Section 3 (MC-Theorem 9).
– The mixing of meta-level and specification-level judgments makes proofs more eas-
ily mechanizable; more generally, there is a fruitful interaction between (co)-induction
principles, meta-logic datatypes, classical reasoning, and hypothetical judgments, which
lends itself to a good deal of automation.
– We are not committed to a single monolithic SL, but we may adopt different ones (linear,
relevant, bunched, etc.) according to the properties of the OL we are encoding. The
only requirement is consistency, to be established with a formalized cut-elimination
argument. We exemplify this methodology using non-commutative linear logic to reason
about continuation machines (Section 5).
Our architecture could also be seen as an approximation of Twelf [104], but it has a
much lower mathematical overhead, simply consisting of a small set of theories (modules)
3 We also compare it with a constructive version implemented in Coq [18], which we describe in Sec-
tion 6.5.
5on top of a proof assistant. In a sense, we could look at Hybrid as a way to “represent”
Twelf’s meta-proofs in the well-understood setting of higher-order logic as implemented in
Isabelle/HOL (or the calculus of (co)inductive constructions as implemented in Coq). Note
that by using a well-understood logic and system, and working in a purely definitional way,
we avoid the need to justify consistency by syntactic or semantic means. For example, we
do not need to show a cut-elimination theorem for a new logic as in [43], nor prove results
such as strong normalization of calculi of the Mω family [103] or about the correctness of
the totality checker behind Twelf [106]. Hence our proofs are easier to trust, as far as one
trusts Isabelle/HOL and Coq.
Additionally, we can view our realization of the two-level approach as a way of “fast
prototyping” HOAS logical frameworks. We can quickly implement and experiment with a
potentially interesting SL; in particular we can do meta-reasoning in the style of tactical the-
orem proving in a way compatible with induction. For example, as we will see in Section 5,
when experimenting with a different logic, such as a sub-structural one, we do not need to
develop all the building blocks of a usable new framework, such as unification algorithms,
type inference or proof search, but we can rely on the ones provided by the proof assistant.
The price to pay is, again, the additional layer where we explicitly reference provability,
requiring a sort of meta-interpreter (the SL logic) to drive it. This indirectness can be allevi-
ated, as we shall see, by defining appropriate tactics, but this is intrinsic to the design choice
of relying on a general ambient logic (here Isabelle/HOL or Coq, in [69,109] some variation
of Linc). This contrasts with the architecture proposed in [67], where the meta-meta-logic is
itself sub-structural (linear in this case) and, as such, explicitly tailored to the automation of
a specific framework.
We demonstrate the methodology by first formally verifying the subject reduction prop-
erty for the standard simply-typed call-by-value λ -calculus, enriched with a recursion op-
erator. While this property (and the calculus as well) has been criticized as too trivial to be
meaningful [6]—and, to a degree, we agree with that—we feel that the familiarity of the set-
up will ease the understanding of the several layers of our architecture. Secondly we tackle a
more complex form of subject reduction, that of a continuation machine, whose operational
semantics is encoded sub-structurally, namely in non-commutative linear logic.
Outline The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls some basic notions of Hybrid
and its implementation in Isabelle/HOL and Coq. Section 3 shows how it can be used as a
logical framework. In Section 4 we introduce a two-level architecture and present the first
example SL and subject reduction proof, while Section 5 introduces a sub-structural SL and
uses it for encoding continuation machines. We follow that up with an extensive review and
comparison of related work in Section 6, and conclude in Section 7. This paper is an archival
documentation of Hybrid 0.1 (see Section 6.5 for the terminology), extending previous joint
work with Simon Ambler and Roy Crole [2, 3, 77–79], Jeff Polakow [81] and Venanzio
Capretta [18].
Notation 1 (Isabelle/HOL) We use a pretty-printed version of Isabelle/HOL concrete syn-
tax. A type declaration has the form s : : [ t1, . . .tn ]⇒ t. We stick to the usual logical symbols
for Isabelle/HOL connectives and quantifiers (¬, ∧, ∨, −→, ∀, ∃). Free variables (upper-
case) are implicitly universally quantified (from the outside) as in logic programming. The
sign == (Isabelle meta-equality) is used for equality by definition, and ∧ for Isabelle uni-
versal meta-quantification. A rule (a sequent) of the schematic form:
H1 . . .Hn
C
6is represented as [[ H1; . . . ;Hn ]] =⇒ C. A rule with discharged assumptions such as con-
junction elimination is represented as [[ P∧Q; [[ P;Q ]] =⇒ R ]] =⇒ R. The keyword MC-
Theorem (Lemma) denotes a machine-checked theorem (lemma), while Inductive intro-
duces an inductive relation in Isabelle/HOL, and datatype introduces a new datatype. We
freely use infix notations, without explicit declarations. We have tried to use the same nota-
tion for mathematical and formalized judgments. The proof scripts underlying this paper are
written in the so-called “Isabelle old style”, i.e., they are exclusively in the tactical-style, e.g.,
sequences of commands. This was still fashionable and supported by Isabelle/HOL 2005, as
opposed to the now required ISAR [58] idioms of the new Isabelle/HOL versions. However,
in the interest of time, intellectual honesty (and also consistency with Coq), we have decided
to base the paper on the original code of the project, which had as a fundamental goal the
automation of two-level reasoning. Naturally, some of the comments that we make about
concrete features of the system, (as well as interactions with it) are by now relevant only to
that version. When those happen to be obsolete, we will try to make this clear to the reader.
We expect, however (and indeed we already are in the process, see Section 6.5) to carry over
this work to the current version of Isabelle/HOL, possibly enhanced by the new features of
the system.
Notation 2 (Coq) We keep Coq’s notation similar to Isabelle/HOL’s where possible. We
use the same syntax for type declarations, though of course the allowable types are different
in the two languages. We also use == for equality by definition and = for equality. There
is no distinction between a functional type arrow and logical implication in Coq, though
we use both ⇒ and =⇒ depending on the context. In Isabelle/HOL, there is a distinction
between notation at the Isabelle meta-level and the HOL object-level, which we do not have
in Coq. Whenever an Isabelle/HOL formula has the form [[ H1; . . . ;Hn ]] =⇒C, and we say
that the Coq version is the same, we mean that the Coq version has the form H1 =⇒ ·· ·=⇒
Hn =⇒ C, or equivalently H1 ⇒ ·· · ⇒ Hn ⇒ C, where implication is right-associative as
usual.
Source files for the Isabelle/HOL and Coq code can be found at hybrid.dsi.unimi.it/
jar [57].
2 Introducing Hybrid
The description of the Hybrid layer of our architecture is taken fairly directly from previous
work, viz. [3]. Central to our approach is the introduction of a binding operator that (1) al-
lows a direct expression of λ -abstraction, and (2) is defined in such a way that expanding its
definition results in the conversion of a term to its de Bruijn representation. The basic idea
is inspired by the work of Gordon [47], and also appears in collaborative work with Mel-
ham [48]. Gordon introduces a λ -calculus with constants where free and bound variables are
named by strings; in particular, in a term of the form (dLAMv t), v is a string representing
a variable bound in t, and dLAM is a function of two arguments, which when applied, con-
verts free occurrences of v in t to the appropriate de Bruijn indices and includes an outer de
Bruijn abstraction operator. Not only does this approach provide a good mechanism through
which one may work with named bound variables under α-renaming, but it can be used
as a meta-logic by building it into an Isabelle/HOL type, say of proper terms, from which
other binding signatures can be defined, as exemplified by Gillard’s encoding of the object
calculus [45]. As in the logical framework tradition, every OL binding operator is reduced
to the λ -abstraction provided by the type of proper terms.
7Our approach takes this a step further and exploits the built in HOAS which is available
in systems such as Isabelle/HOL and Coq. Hybrid’s LAM constructor is similar to Gordon’s
dLAM except that LAM is a binding operator. The syntax (LAMv. t) is actually notation for
(lambda λ v. t), which makes explicit the use of bound variables in the meta-language to
represent bound variables in the OL. Thus the v in (LAMv. t) is a meta-variable (and not a
string as in Gordon’s approach).
At the base level, we start with an inductive definition of de Bruijn expressions, as
Gordon does.
datatype expr = CON con | VAR var | BND bnd | expr $ expr | ABS expr
In our setting, bnd and var are defined to be the natural numbers, and con provides names for
constants. The latter type is used to represent the constants of an OL, as each OL introduces
its own set of constants.
To illustrate the central ideas, we start with the λ -calculus as an OL. To avoid confusion
with the meta-language (i.e., λ -abstraction at the level of Isabelle/HOL or Coq), we use
upper case letters for variables and a capital Λ for abstraction. For example, consider the
object-level term T0 =ΛV1.(ΛV2.V1V2)V1V3. The terms TG and TH below illustrate how this
term is represented using Gordon’s approach and Hybrid, respectively.
TG = dLAM v1 (dAPP (dAPP (dLAM v2 (dAPP (dVAR v1)
(dVAR v2))) (dVAR v1)) (dVAR v3))
TH = LAM v1.(((LAM v2.(v1 $ v2)) $ v1) $ VAR 3)
In Hybrid we also choose to denote object-level free variables by terms of the form (VAR i),
though this is not essential. In either case, the abstraction operator (dLAM or LAM) is de-
fined, and expanding definitions in both TG and TH results in the same term, shown below
using our de Bruijn notation.
ABS (((ABS (BND 1 $ BND 0)) $ BND 0) $ VAR 3)
In the above term all the variable occurrences bound by the first ABS, which corresponds
to the bound variable V1 in the object-level term, are underlined. The lambda operator is
central to this approach and its definition includes determining correct indices. We return to
its definition in Section 2.1.
In summary, Hybrid provides a form of HOAS where object-level:
– free variables correspond to Hybrid expressions of the form (VAR i);
– bound variables correspond to (bound) meta-variables;
– abstractions Λ V.E correspond to expressions (LAMv.e), defined as (lambda λ v.e);
– applications E1 E2 correspond to expressions (e1 $ e2).
2.1 Definition of Hybrid in Isabelle/HOL
Hybrid consists of a small number of Isabelle/HOL theories (actually two, for a total of about
130 lines of definitions and 80 lemmas and theorems), which introduce the basic definition
for de Bruijn expressions (expr) given above and provide operations and lemmas on them,
building up to those that hide the details of de Bruijn syntax and permit reasoning on HOAS
representations of OLs. In this section we outline the remaining definitions, and give some
8examples. Note that our Isabelle/HOL theories do not contain any axioms which require
external justification,4 as in some other approaches such as the Theory of Contexts [55].
As mentioned, the operator lambda : : [expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ expr is central to our approach,
and we begin by considering what is required to fill in its definition. Clearly (lambda e) must
expand to a term with ABS at the head. Furthermore, we must define a function f such that
(lambda e) is (ABS ( f e)) where f replaces occurrences of the bound variable in e with de
Bruijn index 0, taking care to increment the index as it descends through inner abstractions.
In particular, we will define a function lbind of two arguments such that formally:
lambda e == ABS (lbind 0 e)
and (lbind i e) replaces occurrences of the bound variable in e with de Bruijn index i, where
recursive calls on inner abstractions will increase the index. As an example, consider the
function λ v.ABS (BND 0 $ v). In this case, application of lbind with argument index 0
should result in a level 1 expression:
lbind 0 (λ v.ABS (BND 0 $ v)) = . . .= ABS (BND 0 $ BND 1)
and thus:
lambda (λ v.ABS (BND 0 $ v)) = ABS (ABS (BND 0 $ BND 1)).
We define lbind as a total function operating on all functions of type (expr⇒ expr), even
exotic ones that do not encode λ -terms. For example, we could have e = (λx.count x) where
(count x) counts the total number of variables and constants occurring in x. Only functions
that behave uniformly or parametrically on their arguments represent λ -terms. We refer the
reader to the careful analysis of this phenomenon (in the context of Coq) given in [32] and
to Section 6 for more background. We will return to this idea shortly and discuss how to
rule out non-uniform functions in our setting. For now, we define lbind so that it maps non-
uniform subterms to a default value. The subterms we aim to rule out are those that do not
satisfy the predicate ordinary : : [expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ bool, defined as follows:5
ordinary e == (∃a. e = (λ v.CON a)∨
e = (λ v.v)∨
∃n. e = (λ v.VAR n)∨
∃ j. e = (λ v.BND j)∨
∃ f g. e = (λ v. f v $ gv)∨
∃ f . e = (λ v.ABS ( f v)))
We do not define lbind directly, but instead define a relation
lbnd : : [bnd,expr ⇒ expr,expr ]⇒ bool and prove that this relation defines a function
mapping the first two arguments to the third.
4 We will keep emphasizing this point: the package is a definitional extension of Isabelle/HOL and could
be brought back to HOL primitives, if one so wishes.
5 This definition is one of the points where the Isabelle/HOL and Coq implementations of Hybrid diverge.
See Section 2.2.
9Inductive lbnd : : [bnd,expr ⇒ expr,expr ]⇒ bool
=⇒ lbnd i (λ v.CON a) (CON a)
=⇒ lbnd i (λ v.v) (BND i)
=⇒ lbnd i (λ v.VAR n) (VAR n)
=⇒ lbnd i (λ v.BND j) (BND j)
[[ lbnd i f s; lbnd i g t ]] =⇒ lbnd i (λ v. f v $ gv) (s $ t)
lbnd (i+1) f s =⇒ lbnd i (λ v.ABS ( f v)) (ABS s)
¬(ordinary e) =⇒ lbnd i e (BND 0)
In showing that this relation is a function, uniqueness is an easy structural induction. Exis-
tence is proved using the following abstraction induction principle.
MC-Theorem 1 (abstraction induct)
[[
∧
a. P (λ v.CON a);P (λ v.v);∧n. P (λ v.VAR n);∧ j. P (λ v.BND j);∧ f g. [[ P f ;P g ]] =⇒ P (λ v. f v $ gv);∧ f . [[ P f ]] =⇒ P (λ v.ABS ( f v));∧ f . [[ ¬ordinary f ]] =⇒ P f ]] =⇒ P e
The proof of this induction principle is by measure induction (∧x. [[ ∀y. [[ f y < f x −→
P y ]] =⇒P x ]] =⇒P a), where we instantiate f with rank and set ranke== size (e(VAR 0)).
We now define lbind : : [bnd,expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ expr as follows, thus completing the defi-
nition of lambda:
lbind i e == THE s. lbnd i e s
where THE is Isabelle’s notation for the definite description operator ι . From these defini-
tions, it is easy to prove a “rewrite rule” for every de Bruijn constructor. For example, the
rule for ABS is:
MC-Lemma 2 (lbind ABS)
lbind i (λ v.ABS (ev)) = ABS (lbind (i+1) e)
These rules are collected under the name lbind simps, and thus can be used directly in sim-
plification.
Ruling out non-uniform functions, which was mentioned before, will turn out to be im-
portant for a variety of reasons. For example, it is necessary for proving that our encoding
adequately represents the λ -calculus. To prove adequacy, we identify a subset of the terms
of type expr such that there is a bijection between this subset and the λ -terms that we are
encoding. There are two aspects we must consider in defining a predicate to identify this
subset. First, recall that (BND i) corresponds to a bound variable in the λ -calculus, and
(VAR i) to a free variable; we refer to bound and free indices respectively. We call a bound
index i dangling if i or less ABS labels occur between the index i and the root of the expres-
sion tree. We must rule out terms with dangling indices. Second, in the presence of the LAM
constructor, we may have functions of type (expr ⇒ expr) that do not behave uniformly on
their arguments. We must rule out such functions. We define a predicate proper, which rules
out dangling indices from terms of type expr, and a predicate abstr, which rules out dangling
indices and exotic terms in functions of type (expr ⇒ expr).
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To define proper we first define level. Expression e is said to be at level l ≥ 0, if enclosing
e inside l ABS nodes ensures that the resulting expression has no dangling indices.
Inductive level : : [bnd,expr ]⇒ bool
=⇒ level i(CON a)
=⇒ level i(VAR n)
j < i =⇒ level i(BND j)
[[ level i s; level i t ]] =⇒ level i(s $ t)
level (i+1) s =⇒ level i(ABS s)
Then, proper : : expr ⇒ bool is defined simply as:
proper e == level0e.
To define abstr, we first define abst : : [bnd,expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ bool as follows:
Inductive abst : : [bnd,expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ bool
=⇒ abst i (λ v.CON a)
=⇒ abst i (λ v.v)
=⇒ abst i (λ v.VAR n)
j < i =⇒ abst i (λ v.BND j)
[[ abst i f ;abst i g ]] =⇒ abst i (λ v. f v $ gv)
abst (i+1) f =⇒ abst i (λ v.ABS ( f v))
Given abstr : : [expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ bool, we set:
abstr e == abst 0 e.
When an expression e of type expr ⇒ expr satisfies this predicate, we say it is an abstrac-
tion.6 In addition to being important for adequacy, the notion of an abstraction is central to
the formulation of induction principles at the meta-level.7
It’s easy to prove the analogue of abst introduction rules in terms of abstr, for example:
abst 1 f =⇒ abstr (λ v.ABS ( f v))
A simple, yet important lemma is:
MC-Lemma 3 (proper abst)
proper t =⇒ abstr (λ v. t)
So any function is a legal abstraction if its body is a proper expression. This strongly suggests
that were we to turn the predicate proper into a type prpr, then any function with source type
prpr ⇒ prpr would be de facto a legal abstraction8.
It follows directly from the inductive definition of de Bruijn expressions that the func-
tions CON, VAR, $, and ABS are injective, with disjoint images. With the introduction of
abstr, we can now also prove the following fundamental theorem:
6 This is akin to the valid and valid1 predicates present in weak HOAS formalizations such as [32]
(discussed further in Section 6.4), although this formalization has, in our notation, the “weaker” type
(var ⇒ expr)⇒ bool.
7 And so much more for the purpose of this paper: it allows inversion on inductive second-order predicates,
simplification in presence of higher-order functions, and, roughly said, it ensures the consistency of those
relations with the ambient logic.
8 This is indeed the case as we have shown in [80] and briefly comment on at the end of Section 6.
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MC-Theorem 4 (abstr lam simp)
[[ abstr e; abstr f ]] =⇒ (LAMx.e x = LAMy. f y) = (e = f )
which says that lambda is injective on the set of abstractions. This follows directly from an
analogous property of lbind:
MC-Lemma 5 (abst lbind simp lemma)
[[ abst i e; abst i f ]] =⇒ (lbind i e = lbind i f ) = (e = f )
This is proved by structural induction on the abst predicate using simplification with
lbind simps.
Finally, it is possible to perform induction over the quasi-datatype of proper terms.
MC-Theorem 6 (proper VAR induct)
[[ proper u;∧
a. P (CON a);∧
n. P (VAR n);∧
s t. [[ proper s;proper t;P t ]] =⇒ P (s $ t);∧
e. [[ abstr e;∀n. P (e (VAR n)) ]] =⇒ P (LAMx.e x) ]] =⇒ P u
The proof is by induction on the size of e, and follows from the following two lemmas.
MC-Lemma 7
1. level (i+1)e =⇒∃ f . (lbind i f = e)∧ abst i f (level lbind abst)
2. proper (ABS e) =⇒∃ f . (LAMx. f x = ABS e)∧ abstr f (proper lambda abstr)
MC-Lemma 8 (abstr size lbind)
abstr e =⇒ size (lbind i e) = size (e(VAR n))
Note that MC-Theorem 6 does not play any active role in the two-level architecture, as
induction will be performed on the derivability of judgments.
2.2 Remarks on Hybrid in Coq
In this section we comment briefly on the differences between the Isabelle/HOL and Coq
implementations of Hybrid, which arise mainly from the differences in the meta-languages.
Isabelle/HOL implements a polymorphic version of Church’s higher-order (classical) logic
plus facilities for axiomatic classes and local reasoning in the form of locales [8]. Coq imple-
ments a constructive higher-order type theory, but includes libraries for reasoning classically,
which we used in order to keep the implementations as similar as possible.
Note that the definition of lbind uses Isabelle/HOL’s definite description operator, which
is not available in Coq. The use of this operator is the main reason for the differences in
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the two libraries. In Coq, we instead use the description axiom available in Coq’s classical
libraries:9
∀A B : : Type. ∀R : : [A,B ]⇒ Prop.
(∀x. ∃y. (R x y∧∀y′. R x y′ =⇒ y = y′)) =⇒∃ f . ∀x. R x ( f x)
with lbnd as relation R. The Coq version of Hybrid is larger than the Isabelle/HOL version,
mainly due to showing uniqueness for the lbnd relation. We then eliminate the existential
quantifier in the description theorem to get a function that serves as the Coq version of
lbind.10
In more detail, if we consider the Isabelle/HOL theory just described, the operations and
predicates ordinary, lbnd, level, proper, abst, and abstr are defined nearly the same as in the
Isabelle/HOL version. For predicates such as level, we have a choice that we did not have
in Isabelle/HOL . In Coq, Prop is the type of logical propositions, whereas Set is the type
of datatypes. Prop and Set allow us to distinguish logical aspects from computational ones
w.r.t. our libraries. The datatype bool for example, distinct from Prop, is defined inductively
in the Coq standard library as a member of Set. One option in defining level is to define it
as a function with target type bool, which evaluates via conversion to true or f alse. The
other is to define it as an inductive predicate (in Prop), and then we will need to provide
proofs of level subgoals instead of reducing them to true. We chose the latter option, using
Prop in the definition of level and all other predicates. This allowed us to define inductive
predicates in Coq that have the same structure as the Isabelle/HOL definitions, keeping the
two versions as close as possible. For our purposes, however, the other option should have
worked equally well.
For predicates ordinary, lbnd, abst, and abstr, which each have an argument of func-
tional type, there is one further difference in the Coq definitions. Equality in Isabelle/HOL
is extensional, while in Coq, it is not. Thus, it was necessary to define extensional equality
on type (expr ⇒ expr) explicitly and use that equality whenever it is expressed on this type,
viz.
=ext : : [expr ⇒ expr,expr ⇒ expr ]⇒ Prop
Formally, ( f =ext g) == ∀x.( f x = gx). For example, this new equality appears in the def-
inition of abst. In the Coq version, we first define an auxiliary predicate abst aux defined
exactly as abst in Isabelle/HOL, and then define abst as:
abst i e == ∃e′. e′ =ext e∧ abst aux i e′.
The predicate abstr has the same definition as in Isabelle/HOL, via this new version of abst.
The definition of lbnd parallels the one for abst, in this case using lbnd aux. For the ordinary
predicate, we obtain the Coq version from the Isabelle/HOL definition simply by replacing
= with =ext .
The proof that lbnd is a total relation is by induction on rank and the induction case uses
a proof by cases on whether or not a term of type (expr ⇒ expr) is ordinary. Note that the
ordinary property is not decidable, and thus this proof requires classical reasoning, which is
a second reason for using Coq’s classical libraries.
9 In the Coq libraries, a dependent-type version of this axiom is stated, from which the version here follows
directly.
10 Although this elimination is not always justified, it is in our case since we define the type expr to be a
Coq Set .
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Coq provides a module which helps to automate proofs using user-defined equalities that
are declared as setoids. A setoid is a pair consisting of a type and an equivalence relation on
that type. To use this module, we first show that =ext is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
We then declare certain predicates as morphisms. A morphism is a predicate in which it
is allowable to replace an argument by one that is equivalent according to the user-defined
equality. Such replacement is possible as long as the corresponding compatibility lemma is
proved. For example, we declare ordinary, lbnd, abst, and abstr as morphisms. In particular,
the lemma for lbnd proves that if (lbnd i e t), then for all terms e′ that are extensionally
equal to e, we also have (lbnd i e′ t). Setoid rewriting then allows us to replace the second
argument of lbnd by extensionally equal terms, and is especially useful in the proof that
every e is related to a unique t by lbnd.
As stated above, we obtain lbind by eliminating the existential quantifier in the descrip-
tion theorem. Once we have this function, we can define lambda as in Isabelle/HOL and
prove the Coq version of the abstr lam simp theorem (MC-Theorem 4):
abstr e =⇒ abstr f =⇒ [(LAMx.e x = LAMy. f y)←→ (e =ext f )]
Note the use of logical equivalence (←→) between elements of Prop. Extensional equality
is used between elements of type (expr ⇒ expr) and Coq equality is used between other
terms whose types are in Set. Similarly, extensional equality replaces equality in other the-
orems involving expressions of type (expr ⇒ expr). For example abstraction induct (MC-
Theorem 1) is stated as follows:
[[ ∀e a. [[ e =ext (λ v.CON a) ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e [[ e =ext (λ v.v) ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e n. [[ e =ext (λ v.VAR n) ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e j. [[ e =ext (λ v.BND j) ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e f g. [[ e =ext (λ v. f v $ gv);P f ;P g ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e f . [[ e =ext (λ v.ABS ( f v));P f ]] =⇒ P e;
∀e. [[ ¬ordinary e ]] =⇒ P e ]] =⇒ P e
3 Hybrid as a Logical Framework
In this section we show how to use Hybrid as a logical framework, first by introducing
our first OL (Section 3.1) and discussing the adequacy of the encoding of its syntax (Sec-
tion 3.2). Representation and adequacy of syntax are aspects of encoding OLs that are inde-
pendent of the two-level architecture. We then show that some object-level judgments can
be represented directly as inductive definitions (Section 3.3). We also discuss the limitations
of encoding OL judgments in this way, motivating the need for the two-level architecture of
Section 4.
The system at this level provides:
– A suite of theorems: roughly three or four dozens propositions, most of which are only
intermediate lemmas leading to the few that are relevant to our present purpose: namely,
injectivity and distinctness properties of Hybrid constants.
– Definitions proper and abstr, which are important for Hybrid’s adequate representation
of OLs.
– A very small number of automatic tactics: for example proper tac (resp. abstr tac) au-
tomatically recognizes whether a given term is indeed proper (resp. an abstraction).
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We report here the (slightly simplified) code for abstr tac, to give an idea of how
lightweight such tactics are:
fun abstr_tac defs =
simp_tac (simpset()
addsimps defs @ [abstr_def,lambda_def] @ lbind_simps)
THEN’
fast_tac(claset()
addDs [abst_level_lbind]
addIs abstSet.intrs
addEs [abstr_abst, proper_abst]);
First the goal is simplified (simp tac) using the definition of abstr, lambda, other user-
provided lemmas (defs), and more importantly the lbind “rewrite rules” (lbind simps).
At this point, it is merely a question of resolution with the introduction rules for abst
(abstSet.intrs) and a few key lemmas, such as MC-Lemma 3, possibly as elimination
rules. In Isabelle/HOL 2005, a tactic, even a user defined one, could also be “packaged” into
a solver. In this way, it can be combined with the other automatic tools, such as the simplifier
or user defined tactics, viz. 2lprolog tac. (See Section 4.3.)
3.1 Coding the Syntax of an OL in Hybrid
The OL we consider here is a fragment of a pure functional language known as Mini-ML. As
mentioned, we concentrate on a λ -calculus augmented with a fixed point operator, although
this OL could be easily generalized as in [91]. This fragment is sufficient to illustrate the
main ideas without cluttering the presentation with too many details.
The types and terms of the source language are given respectively by:
Types τ ::= i | τ → τ ′
Terms e ::= x | funx.e | e • e′ | fixx.e
We begin by showing how to represent the syntax in HOAS format using Hybrid. Since
types for this language have no bindings, they are represented with a standard datatype,
named tp and defined in the obvious way; more interestingly, as far as terms are concerned,
we need constants for abstraction, application and fixed point, say cABS, cAPP, and cFIX.
Recall that in the meta-language, application is denoted by infix $, and abstraction by LAM.
The above grammar is coded in Hybrid verbatim, provided that we declare these con-
stants to belong to the enumerated datatype con
datatype con = cABS | cAPP | cFIX
add the type abbreviation
uexp == con expr
and the following definitions:
@ : : [uexp,uexp ]⇒ uexp
fun : : [uexp ⇒ uexp]⇒ uexp
fix : : [uexp ⇒ uexp]⇒ uexp
E1 @ E2 == CON cAPP $ E1 $ E2
funx.E x == CON cABS $ LAMx.E x
fix x .E x == CON cFIX $ LAMx.E x
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where fun (resp. fix) is indeed an Isabelle/HOL binder, e.g., (fix x .E x) is a syntax translation
for (fix(λx. E x)). For example, (fix x . funy.x @ y) abbreviates:
(CON cFIX $ (LAMx.CON cABS $ (LAMy.(CON cAPP $ x $ y))))
Note again that the above are only definitions and by themselves would not inherit any of
the properties of the constructors of a datatype. However, thanks to the thin infra-structural
layer that we have interposed between the λ -calculus natively offered by Isabelle and the
rich logical structure provided by the axioms of Isabelle/HOL, it is now possible to prove the
freeness properties of those definitions as if they were the constructors of what Isabelle/HOL
would ordinarily consider an “impossible” datatype as discussed earlier. More formally:
MC-Theorem 9 (”Freeness” properties of constructors) Consider the constructors11
fun,fix,@:
– The constructors have distinct images. For example:
funx.E x 6= (E1 @ E2) (FA clash)
– Every non binding constructor is injective.
– Every binding constructor is injective on abstractions. For example:
[[ abstr E; abstr E ′ ]] =⇒ (fix x .E x = fix x .E ′ x) = (E = E ′)
Proof By a call to Isabelle/HOL’s standard simplification, augmented with the left-to-right
direction of the crucial property abstr lam simp (MC-Theorem 4). ⊓⊔
This result will hold for any signature containing at most second-order constructors,
provided they are encoded as we have exhibited. These “quasi-freeness” properties—
meaning freeness conditionally on whether the function in a binding construct is indeed
an abstraction—are added to Isabelle/HOL’s standard simplifier, so that they will be auto-
matically applied in all reasoning contexts that concern the constructors. In particular, clash
theorems are best encoded in the guise of elimination rules, already incorporating the “ex
falso quodlibet” theorem. For example, FA clash of MC-Theorem 9 is equivalent to:
[[ funx.E x = (E1 @ E2) ]] =⇒ P
3.2 Adequacy of the Encoding
It is a customary proof obligation (at least) w.r.t. higher-order encoding to show that the
syntax (and later the judgments) of an OL such as Mini-ML are adequately represented in
the framework. While this is quite well-understood in a framework such as LF, the “atypi-
cal” nature of Hybrid requires a discussion and some additional work. We take for granted
(as suggested in [3], then painstakingly detailed in [28]) that Hybrid provides an adequate
representation of the λ -calculus. Yet, it would not be possible to provide a “complete” proof
of the adequacy of Hybrid as a theory running on a complex tool such as Isabelle/HOL.
Here we take a more narrow approach, by working with a convenient fiction, i.e., a model of
Hybrid as a simply-typed λ -calculus presented as a logical framework. This includes:
11 By abuse of language, we call constructors what are more precisely Isabelle/HOL constant definitions.
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– a “first-order” λ -calculus (i.e., where bool can only occur as the target of a legal arrow
type) as our term language;
– introduction and elimination rules for atoms generated by their inductive definition;
– simplification on the Hybrid level and modulo other decidable theories such as linear
arithmetic.
We can use this as our framework to represent OLs; further this model is what we consider
when we state meta-theoretical properties of OL encodings and prove them adequate.
We follow quite closely Pfenning’s account in the Handbook of Automated Reason-
ing [90]. By adequacy of a language representation we mean that there is an encoding func-
tion εΓ (·) from OL terms with free variables in Γ to the canonical forms of the framework
in an appropriate signature, as well as its inverse δΓ (·) such that:
1. validity: for every mathematical object t with free variables in Γ , εΓ (t) is a canonical
(and thus unique, modulo α-conversion) representation in the framework. Note that we
use Γ both for the Hybrid and the OL’s variables context;
2. completeness: for every canonical term E over Γ , δΓ (E), results in a unique OL term t;
furthermore εΓ (δΓ (E)) = E and δΓ (εΓ (t)) = t.
3. compositionality: the bijection induced by ε·(·) and δ·(·) commutes with substitution;
formally εΓ ([t1/x]t2) = [εΓ (t1)/x] εΓ (t2) and δΓ ([E1/x]E2) = [δΓ (E1)/x] δΓ (E2).
Clearly the first requirement seems easier to satisfy, while the second one tends to be more
problematic.12 In general, there could be two main obstacles when representing an OL’s
signature with some form of HOAS in a logical framework, both related to the existence of
“undesirable” canonical terms in the framework, i.e., honest-to-goodness terms that are not
in the image of the desired encoding:
1. If the framework is uni-typed, we need predicates to express the well-formedness of
the encoding of expressions of the OL. Such well-formedness properties must now be
proved, differently from settings such as LF, where such properties are handled by type-
checking. In particular, Hybrid constants are not part of a datatype, so they do not enjoy
the usual closure condition. Moreover there are proper Hybrid terms such as LAMx. x $
(VAR 0) that are not in the image of the encoding, but are still canonical forms of type
expr.
2. If the framework is strong enough, in particular if its type system supports at least
a primitive recursive function space, exotic terms do arise, as discussed earlier, i.e.,
terms containing irreducible functions that are not parametric on their arguments, e.g.,
fix x . funy. if x = y then x else y.
As far as the second issue is concerned, we use abstr annotations to get rid of such “non-
parametric” functions. As mentioned by [90] and is standard practice in concrete approaches
(e.g., the vclosed and term predicate in the “locally named/nameless” representation of
[5,70]), we introduce well-formedness predicates (as inductive definitions in Isabelle/HOL)
to represent OL types.
12 Incidentally, some first-order encodings, which are traditionally assumed not to be troublesome, may
fail to satisfy the second requirement in the most spectacular way. Case in point are encodings typical of the
Boyer-Moore theorem prover, e.g., case studies concerning the properties of the Java Virtual Machine [63].
Since the framework’s language consists of S-expressions, a decoding function does not really exist: in fact,
it is only informally understood how to connect a list of pairs of S-exp to an informal function in, say, the
operational semantics of the JVM, assuming that the code maintains the invariants of association lists. Within
Hybrid we can do much better, although we will fall somewhat short of LF’s standards.
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To make clear the correspondence between the OL and its encoding, we re-formulate
the BNF grammar for Mini-ML terms as a well-formedness judgment:
Γ ,x ⊢ x
Γ ⊢ t1 Γ ⊢ t2
Γ ⊢ t1 • t2
Γ ,x ⊢ t
Γ ⊢ funx. t
Γ ,x ⊢ t
Γ ⊢ fixx. t
Based on this formulation, the definition of encoding of a Mini-ML term into Hybrid and
its decoding is unsurprising [91]. Notation-wise, we overload the comma so that Γ ,x means
Γ ∪{x}; we also use Γ for both the context of OL variables and of Hybrid variables of type
uexp:
εΓ ,x(x) = x εΓ (t1 • t2) = εΓ (t1) @ εΓ (t2)
εΓ (funx. t) = funx.εΓ ,x(t) εΓ (fixx. t) = fix x .εΓ ,x(t)
δΓ ,x(x) = x δΓ (E1 @ E2) = δΓ (E1) • δΓ (E2)
δΓ (funx.E) = funx.δΓ ,x(E) δΓ (fix x .E) = fixx.δΓ ,x(E)
We then introduce an inductive predicate ||= isterm of type [uexp set,uexp ]⇒ bool,
which addresses at the same time the two aforementioned issues. It identifies the subset of
uexp that corresponds to the open terms of Mini-ML over a set of (free) variables.
Inductive ||= isterm : : [uexp set,uexp ]⇒ bool
[[ x ∈ Γ ]] =⇒ Γ ||= isterm (x)
[[ Γ ||= isterm E1; Γ ||= isterm E2 ]] =⇒ Γ ||= isterm (E1 @ E2)
[[ ∀x. proper x −→ Γ ,x ||= isterm (E x); abstr E ]] =⇒ Γ ||= isterm (funx.E x)
[[ ∀x. proper x −→ Γ ,x ||= isterm (E x); abstr E ]] =⇒ Γ ||= isterm (fix x .E x)
We can now proceed to show the validity of the encoding in the sense that Γ ⊢ t entails
that Γ ||= isterm εΓ (t) is provable in Isabelle/HOL. However, there is an additional issue:
the obvious inductive proof requires, in the binding case, the derivability of the following
fact:
abstr(λx. εΓ ,x(t)) (1)
A proof by induction on the structure of t relies on
abstr(λx. LAMy.εΓ ,x,y(t))
This holds once λxy.εΓ ,x,y(t) is a biabstraction, namely:
biAbstr(λxy. E x y) =⇒ abstr(λx. LAM y. E x y)
Biabstractions are the generalization of abstractions to functions of type (expr ⇒ expr ⇒
expr)⇒ expr. The inductive definition of this notion simply replays that of abst and we skip
it for the sake of space. We note however that the above theorem follows by structural in-
duction using only introduction and elimination rules for abst. We therefore consider proven
the above fact (1).
If Γ = {x1, . . . ,xn}, we write (proper Γ ) to denote the Isabelle/HOL context
[[ proper x1; . . . ;proper xn ]].
Lemma 10 (Validity of Representation) If Γ ⊢ t, then (proper Γ =⇒ Γ ||= isterm εΓ (t))
is provable in Isabelle/HOL.
Proof By the standard induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ t, using fact (1) in the binding
cases. ⊓⊔
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As far as the converse of Lemma 10 goes, we need an additional consideration. As op-
posed to intentionally weak frameworks [31], Isabelle/HOL has considerable expressive
power; various features of the underlying logic, such as classical reasoning and the axiom
of choice, can be used to construct proofs about an OL that do not correspond to the infor-
mal constructive proofs we aim to formalize. We therefore need to restrict ourselves to a
second-order intuitionistic logic. The issue here is guaranteeing that inverting on hypotheti-
cal judgments respects the operational interpretation of the latter, i.e., the deduction theorem,
rather than viewing them as classical tautologies. We call such a derivation minimal. Since
Isabelle/HOL does have proof terms [12], this notion is in principle checkable.13
Lemma 11 (Completeness of Representation) Let Γ be the set {x1 : uexp, . . . ,xn : uexp};
if (proper Γ =⇒ Γ ||= isterm E) has a minimal derivation in Isabelle/HOL, then δΓ (E) is
defined and yields a Mini-ML expression t such that Γ ⊢ t and εΓ (δΓ (E))= E. Furthermore,
δΓ (εΓ (t)) = t.
Proof The main statement goes by induction on the minimal derivation of proper Γ =⇒
Γ ||= isterm E; we sketch one case: assume proper Γ =⇒Γ ||= isterm (fix x .E x); by inver-
sion, Γ ,x ||= isterm (E x) holds for a parameter x under the assumption proper (Γ ,x). By
definition δΓ (fix x .(E x)) = fixx.δΓ ,x(E x). By the I.H. the term δΓ ,x(E x) is defined and
there is a t s.t. t = δΓ ,x(E x) and Γ ,x ⊢ t. By the BNF rule for fix, Γ ⊢ fixx. t and again by
the I.H. and definition, εΓ (δΓ (fix x .E x)) = fix x .E x. Finally, δΓ (εΓ (t)) = t follows by a
straightforward induction on t. ⊓⊔
Lemma 12 (Compositionality)
1. εΓ ([t1/x]t2) = [εΓ (t1)/x] εΓ (t2), where x may occur in Γ .
2. If δΓ (E1) and δΓ (E2) are defined, then δΓ ([E1/x]E2) = [δΓ (E1)/x] δΓ (E2).
Proof The first result may be proved by induction on t2 as in Lemma 3.5 of [91], since the
encoding function is the same, or we can appeal to the compositionality property of Hybrid,
proved as Theorem 4.3 of [28], by unfolding the Hybrid definition of the constructors. The
proof of the second part is a similar induction on E2. ⊓⊔
Note that completeness and compositionality do not depend on fact (1).
3.3 Encoding Object-Level Judgments
We now turn to the encoding of object-level judgments. In this and the next section, we will
consider the standard judgments for big-step call-by-value operational semantics (e ⇓ v) and
type inference (Γ ⊢ e : τ), depicted in Figure 2. Evaluation can be directly expressed as
an inductive relation (Figure 3) in full HOAS style. Note that substitution is encoded via
meta-level β -conversion in clauses for ev app and ev fix.
This definition is an honest to goodness inductive relation that can be used as any
other one in an HOL-like setting: for example, queried in the style of Prolog, as in
∃t. fix x . funy.x @ y ⇓ t, by using only its introduction rules and abstraction solving. Further
this kind of relations can be reasoned about using standard induction and case analysis. In
13 Note that Isabelle/HOL provides a basic intuitionistic prover iprover, and it could be connected to an
external more efficient one via the sledgehammer protocol.
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e1 ⇓ fun x. e′1 e2 ⇓ v2 [v2/x]e′1 ⇓ v
ev app
e1 • e2 ⇓ v
ev fun
fun x. e ⇓ fun x. e
[fixx.e/x]e ⇓ v
ev fix
fixx.e ⇓ v
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Γ ,x:τ ⊢ e : τ ′
tp fun
Γ ⊢ fun x. e : τ → τ ′
Γ ,x:τ ⊢ e : τ
tp fix
Γ ⊢ fixx.e : τ
Γ (x) = τ
tp var
Γ ⊢ x : τ
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ ′ → τ Γ ⊢ e2 : τ ′
tp app
Γ ⊢ e1 • e2 : τ
Fig. 2 Big step semantics and typing rules for a fragment of Mini-ML.
Inductive ⇓ :: [uexp,uexp ]⇒ bool
[[ E1 ⇓ funx.E ′ x; E2 ⇓ V2; (E ′ V2) ⇓ V ;abstr E ′ ]] =⇒ (E1 @ E2) ⇓ V
[[ ∅ ||= isterm (funx.E x);abstr E ]] =⇒ funx.E x ⇓ funx.E x
[[ E (fix x .E x) ⇓V ; ∅ ||= isterm (fix x .E x);abstr E ]] =⇒ fix x .E x ⇓V
Fig. 3 Encoding of big step evaluation in Mini-ML.
fact, the very fact that evaluation is recognized by Isabelle/HOL as inductive yields inver-
sion principles in the form of elimination rules. This would correspond, in meta-logics such
as Linc, to applications of definitional reflection. In Isabelle/HOL (as well as in Coq) case
analysis is particularly well-supported as part of the datatype/inductive package. Each predi-
cate p has a general inversion principle p.elim, which can be specialized to a given instance
(p t) by an ML built-in function p.mk cases that operates on the current simplification set;
specific to our architecture, note again the abstraction annotations as meta-logical premises
in rules mentioning binding constructs. To take this into account, we call this ML function
modulo the quasi-freeness properties of Hybrid constructors so that it makes the appropriate
discrimination. For example the value of meval mk cases (funx.E ⇓V ) is:
(meval fun E) [[ funx.E x ⇓V ;
∧
F [[∅ ||= isterm (funx.F x); abstr F
lambda E = lambda F ; V = funx.F x ]] =⇒ P ]] =⇒ P
Note also that the inversion principle has an explicit equation lambda E = lambda F
(whereas definitional reflection employs full higher-order unification) and such equations
are solvable only under the assumption that the body of a λ -term is well-behaved (i.e., is an
abstraction).
Finally, using such elimination rules, and more importantly the structural induction prin-
ciple provided by Isabelle/HOL’s inductive package, we can prove standard meta-theorems,
for instance uniqueness of evaluation.
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MC-Theorem 13 (eval unique) E ⇓ F =⇒∀G. E ⇓G −→ F = G.
Proof By induction on the structure of the derivation of E ⇓ F and inversion on E ⇓ G. ⊓⊔
The mechanized proof does not appeal, as expected, to the functionality of substitution,
as the latter is inherited by the meta-logic, contrary to first-order and “weak” HOAS encod-
ings (see Section 6.4). Compare this also with the standard paper and pencil proof, which
usually ignores this property.
We can also prove some “hygiene” results, showing that the encoding of evaluation
preserves properness and well-formedness of terms:
MC-Lemma 14 (eval proper, eval isterm)
1. E ⇓V =⇒ proper E ∧properV
2. E ⇓V =⇒∅ ||= isterm E ∧∅ ||= istermV
Note the absence in Figure 3 of any proper assumptions at all: only the isterm assumptions in
the application and fixed point cases are needed. We have included just enough assumptions
to prove the above results. In general, this kind of result must be proven for each new OL,
but the proofs are simple and the reasoning steps follow a similar pattern for all such proofs.
With respect to the adequacy of object-level judgments, we can establish first the usual
statements, for example soundness and completeness of the representation; for the sake of
clarity as well as brevity in the statement and proof of the lemma we drop the infix syntax in
the Isabelle/HOL definition of evaluation, and omit the obvious definition of the encoding
of said judgment:
Lemma 15 (Soundness of the encoding of evaluation) Let e and v be closed Mini-ML
expressions such that e ⇓ v; then we can prove in Isabelle/HOL (eval ε∅(e) ε∅(v)).
Proof By induction on the derivation of e ⇓ v. Consider the ev fun case: by defi-
nition of the encoding on expressions and its soundness (Lemma 10) we have that
∅ ||= isterm ε∅(funx.e) is provable in Isabelle/HOL; by definition and inversion ∅ ||=
isterm (funx.εx(e)) and abstr (λx. εx(e)) holds, hence by the introduction rules of the induc-
tive definition of evaluation (eval funx.εx(e) funx.εx(e)) is provable, that is, by definition,
(eval ε∅(funx.e) ε∅(funx.e)). The other two cases also use compositionality (Lemma 12)
and the induction hypothesis. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16 (Completeness of the encoding of evaluation) If (eval E V ) has a minimal
derivation in Isabelle/HOL, then δ∅(E) and δ∅(V ) are defined and yield Mini-ML expres-
sions e and v such that e ⇓ v.
Proof It follows from MC-Lemma 14 that ∅ ||= isterm E and ∅ ||= istermV , and thus from
Lemma 11 that δ∅(E) and δ∅(V) are defined. The proof of e ⇓ v follows directly by induc-
tion on the minimal derivation of (eval E V ), using compositionality (Lemma 12). ⊓⊔
Now that we have achieved this, does that mean that all the advantages of HOAS are now
available in a well-understood system such as Isabelle/HOL ? The answer is, unfortunately,
a qualified “no”. Recall the three “tenets” of HOAS:
1. α-renaming for free, inherited from the ambient λ -calculus identifying meta-level and
object-level bound variables;
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2. object-level substitution as meta-level β -reduction;
3. object-level contexts as meta-level assumptions.
As of now, we have achieved only the first two. However, while accomplishing in a con-
sistent and relatively painless way the first two points above is no little feat,14 the second
one, in particular, being in every sense novel, no HOAS system can really be worth its name
without an accounting and exploiting of reasoning in the presence of hypothetical and para-
metric judgments. We consider the standard example of encoding type inference (Figure 2)
in a language such as Twelf. Using Isabelle/HOL-like syntax (where we use bool for Twelf’s
type, the tp app, tp fun, and tp fix rules would be represented as follows:
: :: [uexp, tp ]⇒ bool
[[ E1 : (T ′ → T); E2 : T ′ ]] =⇒ (E1 @ E2) : T
[[ ∀x (x : T −→ (E x) : T ′) ]] =⇒ (funx.E x) : (T → T ′)
[[ ∀x (x : T −→ (E x) : T ) ]] =⇒ (fix x .E x) : T
Each typing judgment x : τ in an object-level context (Γ in Figure 2) is represented as a
logical assumption of the form x : T . In the spirit of higher-order encoding, there is no
explicit representation of contexts and no need to encode the tp var rule. However, because
of the underlined negative recursive occurrences in the above formulas, there is simply no
way to encode this directly in an inductive setting, short of betraying its higher-order nature
by introducing ad-hoc datatypes (in this case lists for environments) and, what’s worse, all
the theory they require. The latter may be trivial on paper, but it is time-consuming and has
little to do with the mathematics of the problem.15
Moreover, at the level of the meta-theory, it is only the coupling of items 2 and 3 above
that makes HOAS encodings—and thus proofs—so elegant and concise; while it is nice
not to have to encode substitution for every new signature, it is certainly much nicer not to
have to prove the related substitution lemmas. This is precisely what the pervasive use of
hypothetical and parametric judgments makes possible—one of the many lessons by Martin-
Lo¨f.
Even when hypothetical judgments are stratified and therefore inductive, using Hybrid
directly within Isabelle/HOL (i.e., at a single level as will become clear shortly) has been
only successful in dealing with predicates over closed terms (such as simulation). However,
it is necessary to resort to a more traditional encoding, i.e., via explicit environments, when
dealing with judgments involving open objects. These issues became particularly clear in the
case-study reported in [79], where the Hybrid syntax allowed the following elegant encoding
of closed applicative (bi)simulation [1]:
[[ ∀T. R ⇓ funx.T x −→ (abstr T −→
∃U. S ⇓ funx.U x∧ abstrU ∧∀p. (T p)4 (U p)) ]]
=⇒ R4 S
together with easy proofs of its basic properties (for example, being a pre-order). Yet, dealing
with open (bi)simulation required the duplication of analogous work in a much less elegant
way.
This does not mean that results of some interest cannot be proved working at one level.
For example, the aforementioned paper (painfully) succeeded in checking non-trivial results
14 Compare this to other methods of obtaining α-conversion by constructing equivalence classes [38, 113]
in a proof assistant.
15 A compromise is the “weak” HOAS view mentioned earlier and discussed in Section 6.4.
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such as a Howe-style proof of congruence of applicative (bi)simulation [56].16 Another
example [2] is the quite intricate verification of subject reduction of MIL-LITE [9], the
intermediate language of the MLj compiler [10].
In those experiments, HOAS in Isabelle/HOL seemed only a nice interlude, soon to be
overwhelmed by tedious and non-trivial (at least mechanically) proofs of list-based proper-
ties of open judgments and by a number of substitutions lemmas that we had hoped to have
eliminated for good. These are the kinds of issues we address with the two-level architecture,
discussed next.
4 A Two-Level Architecture
The specification level mentioned earlier (see Figure 1) is introduced to solve the problems
discussed in the previous section of reasoning in the presence of negative occurrences of
OL judgments and reasoning about open terms. A specification logic (SL) is defined induc-
tively, and used to encode OL judgments. Since hypothetical judgments are encapsulated
within the SL, they are not required to be inductive themselves. In addition, SL contexts can
encode assumptions about OL variables, which allows reasoning about open terms of the
OL. We introduce our first example SL in Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2, we continue the
discussion of the sample OL introduced in Section 3, this time illustrating the encoding of
judgments at the SL level. In Section 4.3, we discuss proof automation and in Section 4.4
we present a variant of the proof in Section 4.2 that illustrates the flexibility of the system.
4.1 Encoding the Specification Logic
We introduce our first SL, namely a fragment of second-order hereditary Harrop formu-
las [75]. This is sufficient for the encoding of our first case-study: subject reduction for the
sub-language of Mini-ML that we have introduced before (Figure 2). The SL language is
defined as follows, where τ is a ground type and A is an atomic formula.
Clauses D ::= ⊤ | A | D1 ∧D2 | G → A | ∀τ x. D | ∀τ→τx. D
Goals G ::= ⊤ | A | G1 ∧G2 | A → G | ∀τ x. G
Context Γ ::= ∅ | A,Γ
The τ in the grammar for goals is instantiated with expr in this case. Thus, quantification is
over a ground type whose exact elements depend on the instantiation of con, which, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2, is defined at the OL level. Quantification in clauses includes second-
order variables. We will use it, for instance, to encode variables E of type expr ⇒ expr that
appear in terms such as funx.E x. Quantification in clauses may also be over first-order vari-
ables of type expr, as well as over variables of other ground types such as tp. In this logic, we
view contexts as sets, where we overload the comma to denote adjoining an element to a set.
Not only does this representation make mechanical proofs of the standard proof-theoretic
properties easier compared to using lists, but it is also appropriate for a sequent calculus that
enjoys contraction and exchange, and designed so that weakening is an admissible property.
This approach will also better motivate the use of lists in sub-structural logics in the next
16 However, it would take a significant investment in man-months to extend the result from the lazy λ -
calculus to more interesting calculi such as [60].
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init
Σ ;(Γ ,A)−→Π A
Σ ;(Γ ,A)−→Π G
→R
Σ ;Γ −→Π A→ G
Σ ;Γ −→Π G1 Σ ;Γ −→Π G2
∧R
Σ ;Γ −→Π G1 ∧G2
⊤R
Σ ;Γ −→Π ⊤
(Σ ,a : τ);Γ −→Π G[a/x]
∀R
Σ ;Γ −→Π ∀τ x. G
Σ ;Γ −→Π G A←− G ∈ [Π ]
bc
Σ ;Γ −→Π A
Fig. 4 A minimal sequent calculus with backchaining
section. Further, in our setting, contexts are particularly simple, namely sets of atoms, since
only atoms are legal antecedents in implications in goals.
The syntax of goal formulas can be directly rendered with an Isabelle/HOL datatype:
datatype oo = tt | 〈atm〉 | oo and oo | atm imp oo | all (expr ⇒ oo)
We write atm to represent the type of atoms; 〈 〉 coerces atoms into propositions. The defi-
nition of atm is left as an implicit parameter at this stage, because various instantiations will
yield the signature of different OLs, specifically predicates used to encode their judgments.
This language is so simple that its sequent calculus is analogous to a logic programming
interpreter. All clauses allowed by the above grammar can be normalized to (a set of) clauses
of the form:
Clauses D ::= ∀σ1 x1 . . .∀σn xn (G→ A)
where n ≥ 0, and for i = 1, . . . ,n, σi is either a ground type, or has the form τ1 → τ2 where
τ1 and τ2 are ground types. In analogy with logic programming, when writing clauses, out-
ermost universal quantifiers will be omitted, as those variables are implicitly quantified
by the meta-logic; implication will be written in the reverse direction, i.e., we write sim-
ply A ←− G,17 or when we need to be explicit about the quantified variables, we write
∀Σ (A ←− G) where Σ = {x1, . . . ,xn}. This notation yields a more proof-search oriented
notion of clauses. In fact, we can write inference rules so that the only left rule is similar
to Prolog’s backchaining. Sequents have the form Σ ;Γ −→Π G, where Σ is the current sig-
nature of eigenvariables and we distinguish clauses belonging to a static database, written
Π , from atoms introduced via the right implication rule, written Γ . The rules for this logic
are given in Figure 4. In the bc rule, [Π ] is the set of all possible instances of clauses in Π
obtained by instantiating outermost universal quantifiers with all closed terms of appropriate
types.
17 This is also why we can dispose of the mutual definition of clauses and goals and avoid using a mutually
inductive datatype, which, in the absence of some form of subtyping, would make the encoding redundant.
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Inductive  :: [atm set,nat,oo ]⇒ bool
=⇒ Γ n tt
[[ Γ n G1; Γ n G2 ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (G1 and G2)
[[ ∀x.proper x −→ Γ n (G x) ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (allx.G x)
[[ A,Γ n G ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (A imp G)
[[ A ∈ Γ ]] =⇒ Γ n 〈A〉
[[ A ←− G; Γ n G ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 〈A〉
Fig. 5 Encoding of a minimal specification logic
This inference system is equivalent to the standard presentation of minimal logic [59],
where the right rules are the same and the left rules (given below) for conjunction, implica-
tion and universal quantification replace the bc rule.
Σ ;Γ ,D1,D2 −→Π G
∧L
Σ ;Γ ,D1∧ D2 −→Π G
Σ ;Γ ,D[t/x]−→Π G
∀L
Σ ;Γ ,∀x. D −→Π G
Σ ;Γ −→Π G Σ ;Γ ,B−→Π A
→L
Σ ;Γ ,(G→ B) −→Π A
In fact, the bc rule is derivable by eliminating the universal quantifiers until the head of a
clause matches the atom on the right and then applying →L. The reader should remember
that we are working in an ambient logic modulo some equational theory (in the case of
Isabelle =αβη ) and that both atomic rules (init and bc) are applicable in the case when an
atom on the right appears as an assumption and unifies with the head of a definite clause in
the program Π . Thus, we can inherit the completeness of uniform provability [75] w.r.t. an
ordinary sequent calculus, which holds for a much more expressive conservative extension
of our SL, namely higher-order Harrop formulas.
We encode this SL in Figure 5. We use the symbol  for the sequent arrow, in this case
decorated with natural numbers that represent the height of a proof; this measure allows us
to reason by complete induction.18 For convenience we write Γ G if there exists an n such
that Γ n G, and furthermore we simply write G when ∅G. The first four clauses of the
definition directly encode the introduction (R) rules of the figure. In the encoding of the ∀R
rule, when we introduce new eigenvariables of type expr, we need to assume that they are
proper. This assumption might be required for proving subgoals of the form (abstr E) for
subterms E :: expr ⇒ expr that appear in the goal as arguments to binding constructors; see
MC-Lemma 3 (proper abst).
We remark that the only dependence on Hybrid in this layer is on the definition of proper.
This will also be true of the SL we consider in Section 5. Although we do not discuss it here,
we could use SLs with (different) kinds of quantifiers that could not be implemented via a
18 Proven in the Isabelle/HOL’s library in the form (
∧
n. ∀m < n. P m =⇒ P n) =⇒ P x.
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datatype but only with Hybrid constants; for example universal quantification in higher-
order logic. In this case, the specification layer would have a much greater dependence
on Hybrid. On the other hand, if we take the alternative solution to proper terms mentioned
earlier (when discussing MC-Lemma 3) and replace expr with a type prpr containing exactly
the terms that satisfy proper, and consider only the SLs presented in this paper, then these
SLs can be parameterized by the type of terms used in quantification, and can be instantiated
with types other than prpr.
In the last two rules in Figure 5, atoms are provable either by assumption or via
backchaining over a set of Prolog-like rules, which encode the properties of the OL in ques-
tion as an inductive definition of the predicate prog of type [atm,oo ]⇒ bool, which will be
instantiated in Section 4.2. The sequent calculus is parametric in those clauses and so are
its meta-theoretical properties. Because prog is static it will be mentioned explicitly only
in adequacy proofs. The notation A ←− G in Figure 5 represents an instance of one of the
clauses of the inductive definition of prog.
As a matter of fact our encoding of the judgment Γ n G can be seen as a simple exten-
sion of the so-called “vanilla” Prolog meta-interpreter, often known as demo [53]; similarly,
the bc rule would correspond to the following clause, using the predicate prog in place of
Prolog’s built-in clause:
demo(Gamma,s(N),A) :− prog(A,G), demo(Gamma,N,G).
Existential quantification could be added to the grammar of goals, as follows:
[[ ∃x.Γ n (G x) ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (ex x. G x)
but this yields no real increase in expressivity, as existentials in the body of goals can be
safely transformed to outermost universal quantifiers, while (continuing the logic program-
ming analogy) the above rule simply delegates the witness choice to the ambient logic uni-
fication algorithm.
As before, the fact that provability is inductive yields inversion principles as elimination
rules. For example the inversion theorem that analyzes the shape of a derivation ending in
an atom from the empty context is obtained simply with a call to the standard mk cases
function, namely mk cases” j 〈A〉” is:
[[  j 〈A〉;
∧
G i. [[ A ←−G; i G; j = Suc i ]] =⇒ P ]] =⇒ P
The adequacy of the encoding of the SL can be established adapting the analogous
proof in [69]. To do so, we overload the decoding function in several ways. First, we need to
decode terms of types other than expr. For example, decoding terms of type expr ⇒ expr is
required for most OLs. For Mini-ML, we also need to decode terms of type tp. The decoding
is extended in the obvious way. For example, for decoding second-order terms, we define
δΣ (λ x.E x) = λ x.δΣ ,x(E x). Second, to decode both goals and clauses, we extend Σ to
allow both first- and second-order variables. We can then extend the decoding so that if G
is a term of type oo with free variables in Σ , then δΣ (G) is its translation to a formula of
minimal logic, and if Γ is a set of terms of type atm set, then δΣ (Γ ) is its translation to a
set of atomic formulas of minimal logic. In addition, we restrict the form of the definition of
prog so that every clause of the inductive definition is a closed formula of the form:
∧
Σ
(
[[ abstr E1; . . . ; abstr En ]] =⇒ (A ←−G)
)
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where Σ is a set of variables including at least E1, . . . ,En, each of type expr ⇒ expr, with
n ≥ 0. To obtain a theory in minimal logic that corresponds to the definition of prog, we
decode each clause to a formula of minimal logic of the form ∀Σ (δΣ (G)→ δΣ (A)). For
SL adequacy, we also need to introduce two conditions, which become additional proof
obligations when establishing OL adequacy. They are:
1. It is only ever possible to instantiate universal quantifiers in prog clauses with terms for
which the decoding is defined.
2. For every term E :: expr ⇒ expr used to instantiate universal quantifiers in prog clauses,
(abstr E) holds.
The latter will follow from the former and the fact that for all terms E :: expr ⇒ expr for
which the decoding is defined, (abstr E) holds.
Lemma 17 (Soundness and completeness of the encoding of the specification logic) Let
prog be an inductive definition of the restricted form described above, and let Π be the
corresponding theory in minimal logic. Let G be a formula of type oo and let Γ be a set of
atoms. Let Σ be a set of variables of type expr that contains all the free variables in Γ and G.
Then the sequent proper Σ =⇒ Γ G has a minimal derivation in Isabelle/HOL (satisfying
conditions 1 and 2 above) if and only if there is a derivation of Σ ;δΣ (Γ ) −→Π δΣ (G)
according to the rules of Figure 4.
Proof The proof of the forward direction follows directly by induction on the minimal
derivation of proper Σ =⇒Γ G. Compositionality (Lemma 12) is needed for the case when
Γ G is proved by the last clause of Figure 5. The proof of the backward direction is by
direct induction on the derivation of Σ ;δΣ (Γ ) −→Π δΣ (G). Compositionality (Lemma 12)
and conditions 1 and 2 are needed for the bc case.
MC-Theorem 18 (Structural Rules) The following rules are admissible:
1. Height weakening: [[ Γ n G; n < m ]] =⇒ Γ m G.19
2. Context weakening: [[ Γ n G; Γ ⊆ Γ ′ ]] =⇒ Γ ′n G.
3. Atomic cut: [[ A,Γ G; Γ  〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ G.
Proof
1. The proof, by structural induction on sequents, consists of a one-line call to an automatic
tactic using the elimination rule for successor (from the Isabelle/HOL library) and the
introduction rules for the sequent calculus.
2. By a similar fully automated induction on the structure of the sequent derivation, com-
bining resolution on the sequent introduction rules with simplification in order to dis-
charge some easy set-theoretic subgoals.
3. Atomic cut is a corollary of the following lemma:
[[ A,Γ i G; Γ  j 〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ i+ j G
easily proved by complete induction on the height of the derivation of A,Γ i G. The
whole proof consists of two dozen instructions, with very little ingenuity required from
the human collaborator.
⊓⊔
19 This lemma turns out to be fairly useful, as it permits manipulation as appropriate of the height of two
sub-derivations, such as in the ∧R rule.
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Inductive ←− :: [atm,oo ]⇒ bool
=⇒ isterm E1 @ E2 ←− 〈isterm E1〉 and 〈isterm E2〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ isterm funx.E x←− allx.(isterm x) imp 〈isterm (E x)〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ isterm fix x .E x ←− allx.(isterm x) imp 〈isterm (E x)〉
[[ abstr E ′1 ]] =⇒ E1 @ E2 ⇓V ←−
〈E1 ⇓ funx.E ′1 x〉 and 〈E2 ⇓ V2〉 and 〈(E ′1 V2) ⇓V 〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ funx.E x ⇓ funx.E x ←− 〈isterm (funx.E x)〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ fix x .E x ⇓V ←− 〈E (fix x .E x) ⇓V 〉 and 〈isterm (fix x .E x)〉
=⇒ (E1 @ E2) : T ←− 〈E1 : (T ′ → T )〉 and 〈E2 : T ′〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ (funx.E x) : (T → T ′)←− allx.(x : T ) imp 〈(E x) : T ′〉
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ (fix x .E x) : T ←− allx.(x : T ) imp 〈(E x) : T 〉
Fig. 6 OL clauses: encoding of well-formedness, evaluation and typing.
4.2 The Object Logic
Recall the rules for call-by-value operational semantics (e ⇓ v) and type inference (Γ ⊢ e : τ)
given in Figure 2. The subject reduction for this source language is stated as usual.
Theorem 19 (Subject Reduction) If e ⇓ v and ⊢ e : τ , then ⊢ v : τ .
Proof By structural induction on evaluation and inversion on typing, using weakening and
a substitution lemma in the ev app and ev fix cases. ⊓⊔
We now return to the encoding of the OL, this time using the SL to encode judgments.
The encoding of OL syntax is unchanged. (See Section 3.) Recall that it involved introducing
a specific type for con. Here, we will also instantiate type atm and predicate prog. In this
section and the next, we now also make full use of the definitions and theorems in both
Hybrid and the SL layers.
Type atm is instantiated as expected, defining the atomic formulas of the OL.
datatype atm = isterm uexp | uexp ⇓ uexp | uexp : tp
The clauses for the OL deductive systems are given as rules of the inductive definition prog
in Figure 6 (recall the notation ←− ). Recall that the encoding of evaluation in Figure 3
and the encoding of the isterm predicate for adequacy purposes both used inductive defini-
tions. Here we define them both at the SL level along with the OL level typing judgment.
Note that no explicit variable context is needed for this version of isterm. They are handled
implicitly by the contexts of atomic assumptions of the SL, resulting in a more direct en-
coding. As before, in the evaluation clauses, there are no proper assumptions and two isterm
assumptions. Neither kind of assumption appears in the clauses for the typing rules. None is
required to prove the analogue of MC-Lemma 14 for both evaluation and typing.
MC-Lemma 20 (eval proper, eval isterm, hastype proper, hastype isterm)
1.  〈E ⇓V 〉=⇒ proper E ∧properV
2.  〈E ⇓V 〉=⇒ 〈isterm E〉∧ 〈istermV 〉
3.  〈E : T 〉=⇒ proper E
4.  〈E : T 〉=⇒  〈isterm E〉
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Proof All the proofs are by standard induction on the given derivation, except the last one,
whose statement needs to be generalized as follows:
[[ ∀E,T. (E : T ) ∈ Γ −→ (isterm E) ∈ Γ ′; Γ i 〈E : T〉 ]] =⇒ Γ ′i 〈isterm E〉
⊓⊔
With the new version of isterm, we restate the Validity and Completeness of Representation
lemmas (Lemmas 10 and 11). Let Γ be the set {x1 : uexp, . . . ,xn : uexp} and let Γ be the set
of atoms {isterm x1, . . . , isterm xn}.
Lemma 21 (Two-level Validity of Representation) If Γ ⊢ e, then the following is provable
in Isabelle/HOL:
proper Γ =⇒ Γ  〈isterm εΓ (e)〉
Lemma 22 (Two-level Completeness of Representation) If there is a minimal derivation
in Isabelle/HOL of proper Γ =⇒ Γ  〈isterm E〉, then δΓ (E) is defined and yields a Mini-
ML expression t such that Γ ⊢ t and εΓ (δΓ (E)) = E. Furthermore, δΓ (εΓ (t)) = t.
We will skip the statement and proof of two-level adequacy of the other OL judgments, hop-
ing that the reader will spot the similarity with the above two lemmas. Note that, although
we do not state it formally, condition 1 of Lemma 17 follows from completeness lemmas
such as Lemma 22. The isterm and abstr assumptions added to the clauses of Figure 6 are
exactly the ones needed to establish this fact for this OL.
We remark again that the combination of Hybrid with the use of an SL allows us to
simulate definitional reflection [50] via the built-in elimination rules of the prog inductive
definition without the use of additional axioms. For example the inversion principle of the
function typing rule is:
[[ (funx.(E x) : τ)←− G;
∧
F T1 T2. [[ abstr F ;G = allx.(x : T1) imp 〈(F x) : T2〉);
lambda E = lambda F ;τ = (T1 → T2) ]] =⇒ P ]] =⇒ P
Before turning to the proof of Theorem 19, we first illustrate the use of this encoding
with the following simple OL typing judgment.
MC-Lemma 23 ∃T. 〈funx. funy.x @ y : T 〉
Proof This goal is equivalent to: ∃T.∃n.∅n 〈funx. funy.x @ y : T 〉. It can be proved fully
automatically by a simple tactic described below. Here, we describe the main steps in detail
to acquaint the reader with the OL/SL dichotomy and in particular to show how the two
levels interact. We use the instantiations for T and n that would be generated by the tactic
and show:
∅8 〈funx. funy.x @ y : (i→ i)→ (i→ i)〉.
We apply the last rule of the SL in Figure 5, instantiating the first premise with the OL clause
from Figure 6 encoding the tp fun rule for typing abstractions, leaving two premises to be
proved:
(funx. funy.x @ y) : (i→ i)→ (i→ i)←− allx.(x : i→ i) imp 〈funy.x @ y : i→ i〉;
∅7 allx.(x : i→ i) imp 〈funy.x @ y : i→ i〉.
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The first now matches directly the clause in Figure 6 for tp fun, resulting in the proof
obligation (abstr λx.funy.x @ y) which is handled automatically by abstr tac discussed in
Section 3. To prove the second, we apply further rules of the SL to obtain the goal:
[[ proper x ]] =⇒ {x : i→ i}5 〈funy.x @ y : i→ i〉.
We now have a subgoal of the same “shape” as the original theorem. Repeating the same
steps, we obtain:
[[ proper x;proper y ]] =⇒{x : i→ i,y : i}2 〈x @ y : i〉.
Along the way, the proof obligation (abstr λy.x @ y) is proved by abstr tac. The assumption
(proper x) is needed to complete this proof. At this point, we again apply the SL backchain
rule using the OL clause for tp app, obtaining two subgoals, the first of which is again
directly provable from the OL definition. The second:
[[ proper x;proper y ]] =⇒{x : i→ i,y : i}1 〈x : i→ i〉 and 〈y : i〉.
is completed by applying the rules in Figure 5 encoding the ∧R and init rules of the SL. ⊓⊔
The code for the 2lprolog tac tactic automating this proof and others involving OL goals
using the SL is a simple modification of the standard fast tac tactic:
fun 2lprolog_tac defs i =
fast_tac(HOL_cs addIs seq.intrs @ prog.intrs
(simpset() addSolver (abstr_solver defs))) i;
It is based on logic programming style depth-first search (although we could switch to
breadth-first or iterative deepening) using a small set of initial axioms for the core of higher-
order logic (HOL_cs), the rules of the SL (seq.intrs) and of the OL (prog.intrs). Addi-
tionally, it also employs simplification augmented with abstr tac as discussed in Section 3.
Now we have all the elements in place for a formal HOAS proof of Theorem 19. Note
that while a substitution lemma for typing plays a central role in the informal subject reduc-
tion proof, here, in the HOAS tradition, it will be subsumed by the use of the cut rule on the
hypothetical encoding of the typing of an abstraction.
MC-Theorem 24 (OL subject reduction)
∀n. n 〈E ⇓V 〉=⇒ (∀T.  〈E : T 〉 → 〈V : T 〉)
Proof The proof is by complete induction on the height of the derivation of evaluation. It
follows closely the proofs in [36, 69], although those theorems are for the lazy λ -calculus,
while here we consider eager evaluation. Applying meta-level introduction rules and induc-
tion on n, we obtain the sequent:
[[ IH; n 〈E ⇓V 〉,  〈E : T 〉 ]] =⇒ 〈V : T 〉
where IH is the induction hypothesis:
∀m < n. E, V. m 〈E ⇓V 〉 −→ (∀T.  〈E : T 〉 −→ 〈V : T〉).
Since the right side of the SL sequent in the middle hypothesis is an atom and the left side
is empty, any proof of this sequent must end with the last rule of the SL in Figure 5, which
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implements the bc rule. Also, since the right side is an evaluation judgment, backchaining
must occur on one of the middle three clauses of the OL in Figure 6, thus breaking the
proof into three cases. In the formal proof, we obtain these three cases by applying standard
inversion tactics:
[[ IH[i+1/n]; abstr E ′1; (i 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E ′1 x〉 and 〈E2 ⇓V2〉 and 〈(E ′1 V2) ⇓V 〉);
 〈(E1 @ E2) : T 〉 ]] =⇒ 〈V : T 〉 (2)
[[ IH[i+1/n]; abstr E; i 〈isterm (funx.E x)〉;  〈(funx.E x) : T 〉 ]]
=⇒  〈(funx.E x) : T 〉
[[ IH[i+1/n]; abstr E; (i 〈E (fix x .E x) ⇓V 〉 and 〈isterm (fix x .E x)〉);
 〈(fix x .E x) : T 〉 ]] =⇒ 〈V : T 〉
where IH[i+1/n] denotes IH with the single occurrence of n replaced by i+1. The theo-
rems mentioned earlier about injectivity and distinctness of the constructors fun, @, and fix
are used by the inversion tactics. In contrast, in the proof in [36], because these construc-
tors were not defined inductively, specialized inversion theorems were proved from axioms
stating the necessary injectivity and distinctness properties, and then applied by hand. The
second subgoal above is directly provable. We illustrate the first one further. Applying in-
version to both the third and fourth hypotheses of the first subgoal, the subgoal reduces it
to:
[[ IH[i+3/n]; abstr E ′1; i+1 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E ′1 x〉; i+1 〈E2 ⇓V2〉;
i 〈(E ′1 V2) ⇓V 〉; 〈E1 : T ′ → T〉;  〈E2 : T ′〉 ]]
=⇒ 〈V : T 〉.
It is now possible to apply the induction hypothesis to the typing and evaluation judgments
for E1 and E2 to obtain:
[[ IH[i+3/n]; abstr E ′1; i+1 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E ′1 x〉; i 〈E2 ⇓V2〉; i 〈(E ′1 V2) ⇓V 〉; . . . ;
 〈funx.E ′1 x : T ′ → T 〉;  〈V2 : T ′〉 ]]
=⇒ 〈V : T 〉.
We can now apply inversion to the hypothesis with the arrow typing judgment involving
both the fun constructor of the OL and the all constructor of the SL. Inversion at the OL
level gives:
[[ IH[i+3/n]; abstr E ′1; i+1 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E ′1 x〉; i 〈E2 ⇓V2〉; i 〈(E ′1 V2) ⇓V 〉; . . . ;
 〈V2 : T ′〉; abstr E; lambda E = lambda E ′1;  allx.(x : T ′ imp 〈(E x) : T 〉) ]]
=⇒ 〈V : T 〉.
The application of the inversion principle prog.mkH cases similar to the one from Section 3
is evident here. MC-Theorem 4 can be applied to conclude that E = E ′1. Applying inversion
at the SL level gives:
[[ IH[i+3/n]; abstr E; i+1 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E x〉; i 〈E2 ⇓V2〉; i 〈(E V2) ⇓V 〉; . . . ;
 〈V2 : T ′〉; ∀x.(proper x −→ x : T ′ imp 〈(E x) : T 〉) ]]
=⇒  〈V : T 〉.
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Inversion cannot be applied directly under the universal quantification and implication of
the last premise, so we prove the following inversion lemma, which is also useful for the fix
case of this proof.
[[ ∀x.proper x −→ Γ i (x : T1 imp 〈(E x) : T2〉) ]] =⇒ ∃ j. i = j+1∧ (3)
∀x.proper x−→
(x : T1,Γ  j 〈(E x) : T2〉)
From this lemma, and the fact that (proper V2) holds by MC-Lemma 14, we obtain:
[[ IH[i+3/n]; abstr E; i+1 〈E1 ⇓ funx.E x〉; i 〈E2 ⇓V2〉; i 〈(E V2) ⇓V 〉; . . . ;
 〈V2 : T ′〉; ((V2 : T ′) j 〈(E V2) : T 〉) ]]
=⇒  〈V : T 〉.
Applying the cut rule of MC-Theorem 18 allows us to conclude  〈(E V2) : T 〉. We can
then complete the proof by applying the induction hypothesis a third time using this fact and
i 〈(E V2) ⇓V 〉. ⊓⊔
A key point in this section, perhaps worth repeating, is that the clauses for typing are
not inductive and would be rejected in an inductive-based proof assistant, or at best, asserted
with no guarantee of consistency. Here, instead, the typing rules are encapsulated into the
OL level (the prog predicate) and executed via the SL, so that OL contexts are implicitly
represented as SL contexts. Therefore, we are able to reproduce full HOAS proofs, at the
price of a small degree of indirectness—the need for an interpreter (the SL) for the prog
clauses (the OL). One may argue that this seems at first sight a high price to pay, since we
lose the possibility of attacking the given problem directly within the base calculus and its
tools. However, very simple tactics, including a few safe additions to Isabelle/HOL’s default
simplifier and rule set20 make the use of the SL in OL proofs hardly noticeable, as we explain
next.
4.3 Tactical support
We chose to develop Hybrid as a package, rather than a stand-alone system mainly to exploit
all the reasoning capabilities that a mature proof assistant can provide: decision procedures,
rewrite rules, counter-model checking, extensive libraries, and support for interactive theo-
rem proving. Contrast this with a system such as Twelf, where proofs are manually coded
and post-hoc checked for correctness. Moreover, in Twelf as well as in Abella, any do-
main specific knowledge has to be coded as logic programming theories and all the relevant
theorems proven about them.21 At the same time, our aim is to try to retain some of the
conciseness of a language such as LF, which for us means hiding most of the administrative
reasoning concerning variable binding and contexts. Because of the “hybrid” nature of our
approach, this cannot be completely achieved, but some simple-minded tactics go a long
way toward mechanizing most of boilerplate scripting. We have already explained how to
use specific tactics to recognize proper terms and abstractions. Now, we can concentrate on
assisting two-level reasoning, which would otherwise be encumbered by the indirection in
accessing OL specifications via the SL. Luckily, Twelf-like reasoning22 consists, at a high-
20 In Isabelle a rule is considered safe roughly if it does not involve backtracking on instantiation of un-
knowns.
21 Twelf does have constraint domains such as the rationals, but those are currently incompatible with
totality checking, making meta-proofs very hard to trust.
22 In Abella this is even more apparent.
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Inductive ⇓ :: [uexp,uexp ]⇒ bool
[[ E1 ⇓ funx.E ′ x; E2 ⇓ V2; (E ′ V2) ⇓ V ; abstr E ′ ]] =⇒ (E1 @ E2) ⇓V
[[  〈isterm (funx.E x)〉; abstr E ]] =⇒ funx.E x ⇓ funx.E x
[[ E (fix x .E x) ⇓V ;  isterm (fix x .E x); abstr E ]] =⇒ fix x .E x ⇓ V
Fig. 7 Alternate HOAS encoding of big step evaluation
level, of three basic steps: inversion, which subsumes instantiation of (meta-level) eigen-
variables as well as (case) analysis on the shape of a given judgment, backchaining (filling,
in Twelf’s terminology) and recursion. This corresponds to highly stereotyped proof scripts
that we have abstracted into:
1. an inversion tactic defL tac, which goes through the SL inverting on the bc rule and
applies as an elimination rule one of the OL clauses. This is complemented by the eager
application of other safe elimination rules (viz. invertible SL rules such as conjunction
elimination). This contributes to keeping the SL overhead to a minimum;
2. a dual backchaining tactic defR tac, that calls bc and the applicable prog rule. The latter
is the basic single step into the tactic 2lprolog tac, which performs automatic depth first
search (or other searches supported by Isabelle) on Prolog-like goals;
3. a complete induction tactic, to be fired when given the appropriate derivation height by
the user and yielding as additional premise the result of the application of the IH.
4.4 A Variation
As mentioned, the main reason to explicitly encode a separate notion of provability is the
intrinsic incompatibility of induction with non-stratifiable hypothetical judgments. On the
other hand, as remarked in [77], our definition of OL evaluation, though it exploits Hybrid’s
HOAS to implement OL substitution, makes no use of hypothetical judgments. In fact, our
encoding in Figure 3 showed that it is perfectly acceptable to define evaluation of the OL at
the meta-level. Now, we can give a modified version of this definition using the new isterm
defined at the SL level. The new definition is given in Figure 7. Moreover, it is easy to show
(formally) that the encoding in Figure 7 is equivalent to the one in Figure 6:
MC-Theorem 25 E ⇓V if and only if n 〈E ⇓V 〉.
Proof Left-to right holds by straightforward structural induction on evaluation using in-
troduction rules over sequents and prog clauses. The converse is a slightly more delicate
complete induction on the height of the derivation, requiring some manual instantiations.
⊓⊔
The same remark applies also to hypothetical and parametric judgments, provided they
are stratified (see the previously cited definition of applicative bisimulation). This suggests
that we can, in this case, take a different approach from McDowell & Miller’s architec-
ture [69] and opt to delegate to the OL level only those judgments, such as typing, that
would not be inductive at the meta-level. This has the benefit of limiting the indirectness of
using an explicit SL. Moreover, it has the further advantage of replacing complete induc-
tion with structural induction, which is better behaved from a proof-search point of view.
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Complete induction, in fact, places an additional burden on the user by requiring him/her
to provide the correct instantiation for the height of the derivation in question, so that the
inductive hypothesis can be fired. While this is not an intellectual issue, it often limits the
possibility of a complete, i.e., without user intervention, mechanization of a proof via the
automatic tools provided by the proof assistant.
As it turns out, this approach is again reminiscent of a fairly old idea from the theory
of logic programming, namely the amalgamation of object and meta-language as initially
suggested in [15], where clauses can be written interspersing ordinary Prolog predicates
with calls to a specific meta-interpreter of the demo sort. This clearly also pertains to goals,
i.e., in our setting, theorems: subject reduction at the meta-level (i.e., amalgamated subject
reduction) has the form:
MC-Theorem 26 (meta subject reduction)
E ⇓V =⇒∀T.( 〈E : T 〉)−→ ( 〈V : T 〉)
Proof The proof is similar but slightly simpler than the proof of MC-Theorem 24. Instead of
complete induction, we proceed by structural induction on the evaluation judgment, which
breaks the proof into three cases. We again consider the application case:
[[ IH1; IH2; IH3; abstr E ′1; (E1 ⇓ funx.E
′
1 x); (E2 ⇓V2);
((E ′1 V2) ⇓V );  〈(E1 @ E2) : T 〉 ]] =⇒  〈V : T 〉
where IH1, IH2, and IH3 are the following three induction hypotheses:
IH1 : ∀T. 〈E1 : T 〉=⇒ 〈(funx.E ′1 x) : T〉
IH2 : ∀T. 〈E2 : T 〉=⇒ 〈V2 : T 〉
IH3 : ∀T. 〈(E ′1 V2) : T 〉=⇒ 〈V : T 〉
This subgoal corresponds to subgoal (2) in the proof of MC-Theorem 24, with several dif-
ferences. For instance, subgoal (2) was obtained by an application of complete induction
followed by inversion on the OL and SL, while the above subgoal is a direct result of apply-
ing structural induction. Also, although both subgoals have three evaluation premises, in (2)
they are inside conjunction at the SL level. Finally, the general induction hypothesis IH on
natural numbers in (2) is replaced by three induction hypotheses here, generated from the
premises of the meta-level definition of the evaluation rule for application. The remaining
steps of the proof of this case are essentially the same as the steps for MC-Theorem 24.
Inversion on the typing judgment is used exactly as before since in both proofs, typing is
expressed via the SL. Also, the three induction hypotheses in this proof are used to reach
the same conclusions as were obtained using the single induction hypothesis three times in
the previous proof. ⊓⊔
Now that we have seen some proofs of properties of OLs, we can ask what the minimal
set of theorems and tactics is that the two-level architecture needs from Hybrid. The answer
is: very little. Essentially all we need is the quasi-freeness properties of the Hybrid type,
which are inherited from the OL:
– clash rules to rule out impossible cases in elimination rules;
– injectivity facts, all going back to abstr lam simp to simplify equations of the form
lambda E = lambda F for second-order functions E and F ;
– an abstraction solver.23
23 Again, this is not needed anymore in a newer version of Isabelle/HOL and of our package [80].
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The reader may find in [77] other examples, such as the verification of properties of
compilation, of encoding OLs using inductive predicates (types) at the meta-level for all
stratifiable object-level judgments. However, this style of reasoning is viable only when
there is a substantial coincidence between the meta-logical properties of the SL and the
ambient (meta-) logic. Were such properties to clash with an encoding that could benefit
from being driven by a more exotic logic, then all OL predicates will have to be embedded
as prog clauses. This, it may be argued, is a relatively small price to pay for the possibility of
adopting an SL that better fits the logical peculiarities of interesting OLs, as we investigate
next.
5 Ordered Linear Logic as a Specification Logic
In this section we aim to show the flexibility of the two-level architecture by changing SL
in order to have a better match with the encoding on hand; the case-study we consider here
is the operational semantics of a continuation-based abstract machine, where evaluation is
sequentialized: an instruction is executed in the context of a continuation describing the rest
of the computation and eventually returning an answer. We will adopt an ordered logical
framework (OLF) [96]. The general methodology consists of refining a logical framework
in a conservative way, so as to capture different object-level phenomena at the right level
of abstraction. Conservativity here guarantees that if a new feature (such as order) is not
required, it does not interfere with the original system.
Although frameworks based on intuitionistic logic have been fairly fruitful, it so hap-
pens that the structural properties of the framework, namely weakening, contraction and
exchange, are inherited by the object-level encodings. We have argued that one of the keys
to the success of an encoding lies in the ability of specifying judgments “in-a-context” ex-
ploiting the context of the SL itself; however those properties may not always be appropriate
for every domain we want to investigate. Another case in point is the meta-theory of lan-
guages with imperative features, where the notion of (updatable) state is paramount. It has
been frequently observed that an elegant representation of the store may rely on a volatile
notion of context. Linear logic is then the natural choice, since it offers a notion of context
where each assumption must be used exactly once; a declarative encoding of store update
can be obtained via linear operations that, by accessing the context, consume the old assump-
tion and insert the new one. This is one of the motivations for proposing frameworks based
on linear logics (see [74] for an overview) such as Lolli [54], Forum [73], and LLF [20], a
conservative extension of LF with multiplicative implication, additive conjunction, and unit.
Yet, at the time of writing this article, work on the automation of reasoning in such frame-
works is still in its infancy [67] and may take other directions, such as hybrid logics [102].
The literature offers only a few formalized meta-theoretical investigations with linear logic
as a framework, an impressive one being the elegant encoding of type preservation of Mini-
ML with references (MLR) in LLF [20]. However, none of them comes with anything like
a formal certification of correctness that would make people believe they are in the pres-
ence of a proof. Encoding in LLF lacks an analogue of Twelf’s totality checker. Moreover
this effort may be reserved to LLF’s extension, the Concurrent Logical Framework [115]. A
FOλ ∆ INproof of a similar result is claimed in [69], but not only the proof is not available,
but it has been implemented with Eriksson’s Pi, a proof checker [34] for the theory of partial
inductive definitions, another software system that seems not to be available anymore.
This alone would more than justify the use of a fragment of linear logic as an SL on
top of Hybrid, whose foundation, we have argued, is not under discussion. However, we
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want to go beyond the logic of state, towards a logic of order. In fact, a continuation-based
abstract machine follows an order, viz. a stack-like discipline; were we able to also inter-
nalize this notion, we would be able to simplify the presentation, and hence, the verification
of properties of the continuation itself, taking an additional step on the declarative ladder.
Our contribution here to the semantics of continuation machines is, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, to dispose of the notion of continuation itself via internalization in an ordered context,
in analogy with how the notion of state is realized in the linear context. In particular, the
ordered context is used to encode directly the stack of continuations to be evaluated, rather
than building an explicit stack-like structure to represent a continuation. While this is the-
oretically non-problematic, it introduces entities that are foreign to the mathematics of the
problem and which bring their own numerous, albeit trivial, proof obligations.24 Further and
more importantly, machine states can be mapped not into OL data, but OL provability.
Ordered (formerly known as non-commutative) linear logic [98] combines reasoning
with unrestricted, linear and ordered hypotheses. Unrestricted (i.e., intuitionistic) hypothe-
ses may be used arbitrarily often, or not at all regardless of the order in which they were
assumed. Linear hypotheses must be used exactly once, also without regard to the order of
their assumption. Ordered hypotheses must be used exactly once, subject to the order in
which they are assumed.
This additional expressive power allows the logic to handle directly the notion of stack.
Stacks of course are ubiquitous in computer science and in particular when dealing with
abstract and virtual machines. OLF has been previously applied to the meta-theory of pro-
gramming languages, but only in paper and pencil proofs: Polakow and Pfenning [99] have
used OLF to formally show that terms resulting from a CPS translation obey ”stackability”
and linearity properties [30]. Polakow and Yi [100] later extended these techniques to lan-
guages with exceptions. Remarkably, the formalization in OLF provides a simple proof of
what is usually demonstrated via more complex means, i.e., an argument by logical relations.
Polakow [96] has also investigated proof-search and defined a first-order logic programming
language with ordered hypotheses, called Olli, based on the paradigm of abstract logic pro-
gramming and uniform proofs, from which we draw inspiration for our ordered SL, i.e., a
second-order minimal ordered linear sequent calculus.
We exemplify this approach by implementing a fragment of Polakow’s ordered logic
as an SL and test it with a proof of type preservation of a continuation machine for Mini-
ML, as we sketched in [81]. For the sake of presentation we shall deal with a call-by-name
operational semantics. It would not have been be unreasonable to use MLR as a test case,
where all the three different contexts would play a part. However, linearity has already been
thoroughly studied, while we wish to analyze ordered assumptions in isolation, and for that
aim, a basic continuation machine will suffice (but see [65] for a thorough investigation of
the full case). Further, although the SL implementation handles all of second-order Olli and
in particular proves cut-elimination for the whole calculus, we will omit references to the
(unordered) linear context and linear implication, as well as to the ordered left implication,
since they do not play any role in this case-study.
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initΩ
Γ ;A −→Π A
initΓ
Γ ,A; · −→Π A
(A,Γ );Ω −→Π G
→R
Γ ;Ω −→Π A→ G
Γ ;(Ω ,A)−→Π G
։R
Γ ;Ω −→Π A։G
Γ ;Ω −→Π G1 Γ ;Ω −→Π G2
∧R
Γ ;Ω −→Π G1∧G2
⊤R
Γ ;Ω −→Π ⊤
Γ ;Ω −→Π G[a/x]
∀aR
Γ ;Ω −→Π ∀x. G
(A ←− [G1, . . . ,Gm] | [G′1, . . . ,G′n]) ∈ [Π ]
Γ ; · −→Π G1 . . . Γ ; · −→Π Gm
Γ ;Ω1 −→Π G′1 . . . Γ ;Ωn −→Π G′n
bc
Γ ;Ωn . . .Ω1 −→Π A
Fig. 8 Sequent rules for Olli2։
5.1 Encoding the Specification Logic
We call our specification logic Olli2։, as it corresponds to the aforementioned fragment of
Olli, where ’։’ denotes right-ordered implication. We follow [81] again in representing the
syntax as:
Goals G ::= A | A→ G | A։G | G1 ∧G2 | ⊤ | ∀τ x. G
Clauses P ::= ∀(A←− [G1, . . . ,Gm] | [G′1, . . . ,G′n])
The body of a clause ∀(A←− [G1, . . . ,Gm] | [G′1, . . . ,G′n]) consists of two lists, the first one of
intuitionistic goals, the other of ordered ones. It represents the “logical compilation” of the
formula ∀(Gm → . . .→G1 →G′n։ . . .։G′1։A). We choose this compilation to emphasize
that if one views the calculus as a non-deterministic logic programming interpreter, the latter
would solve subgoals from innermost to outermost. Note also that this notion of clause
makes additive conjunction useless, although we allow it in goals for a matter of style and
consistency with the previous sections.
Our sequents have the form:
Γ ;Ω −→Π G
where Π contains the program clauses, which are unrestricted (i.e., they can be used an
arbitrary number of times), Γ contains unrestricted atoms, Ω contains ordered atoms and
G is the formula to be derived. Contexts are lists of hypotheses, where we overload the
comma to denote adjoining an element to a list at both ends. To simplify matters further,
we leave eigenvariable signatures implicit. One may think of the two contexts as one big
24 This is not meant to say that intuitionistic meta-logic, (full) HOAS and list-based techniques cannot cope
with mutable data: in fact, significant case studies have been tackled: for example, Crary and Sarkar’s proof
of soundness for foundational certified code in typed assembly language for the x86 architecture [27] as well
the more recent attempt by Lee et al. [61] to verify an internal language for full SML.
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context where the ordered hypotheses are in a fixed relative order, while the intuitionistic
ones may float, copy or delete themselves. The calculus is depicted in Figure 8. Again in this
fragment of the logic, implications have only atomic antecedents. There are obviously two
implication introduction rules, where in rule ։R the antecedent A is appended to the right
of Ω , while in the other rule we have (A,Γ ), but it could have been the other way around,
since here the order does not matter. Then, we have all the other usual right sequent rules
to break down the goal and they all behave additively. Note how the ⊤R rule can be used in
discharging any unused ordered assumptions. For atomic goals there are two initial sequent
rules, for the leaves of the derivation: initΩ enforces linearity requiring Ω to be a singleton
list, while initΓ demands that all ordered assumptions have been consumed. Additionally,
there is a single backchaining rule that simultaneously chooses a program formula to focus
uponand derives all the ensuing subgoals; rule (bc) is applied provided there is an instance
A ←− [G1 . . .Gm] | [G′1 . . .G′n] of a clause in the program Π . Note that the rule assumes that
every program clause must be placed to the left of the ordered context. This assumption is
valid for our fragment of the logic because it only contains right ordered implications (։)
and the ordered context is restricted to atomic formulas. Furthermore, the ordering of the Ωi
in the conclusion of the rule is forced by our compilation of the program clauses. We leave
to the keen reader the task to connect formally our backchain rule to the focused uniform
proof system of op. cit. [96].
We encode this logical language extending the datatype from Section 4.1 with right
implication, where again outermost universal quantifiers will be left implicit in clauses.
datatype oo = · · · | atm։oo
Our encoding of the Olli2։ sequent calculus uses three mutually inductive definitions,
motivated by the compilation of the body of clauses into additive and multiplicative lists:25
Γ | Ω n G :: [atm list,atm list,nat,oo ]⇒ bool
goal G has an ordered linear derivation from Γ and Ω of height n
Γ n Gs :: [atm list,nat,oo list ]⇒ bool
list of goals Gs is additively provable from Γ etc.
Γ | Ω n Gs :: [atm list,atm list,nat,oo list ]⇒ bool
list of goals Gs is multiplicatively consumable given Γ and Ω etc.
The rendering of the first judgment is completely unsurprising,26 except, perhaps, for the
backchain rule, which calls the list predicates required to recur on the body of a clause:
[[ (A ←−OL | IL) ; Γ | Ω n OL ; Γ n IL ]] =⇒ Γ | Ω n+1 〈A〉
The notation A ←− OL | IL corresponds to the inductive definition of a set prog this time of
type [atm,oo list,oo list ]⇒ bool, see Figure 12. Backchaining uses the two list judgments to
encode, as we anticipated, execution of the (compiled) body of the focused clause. Intuition-
istic list provability is just an additive recursion through the list of intuitionistic subgoals:
=⇒ Γ n [ ]
[[ Γ | [ ]n G ; Γ n Gs ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (G,Gs)
25 Note that Γ could have easily been a set, as in Section 4.
26 As a further simplification, the encoding of the ∀R rule will not introduce the proper assumption, but the
reader should keep in mind the fact that morally every eigenvariable is indeed proper.
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Ordered list consumption involves an analogous recursion, but it behaves multiplicatively
w.r.t. the ordered context. Reading the rule bottom up, the current ordered context Ω is non-
deterministically split into two ordered parts, one for the head ΩG and one ΩR for the rest
of the list of subgoals.
=⇒ Γ | [ ]n [ ]
[[ osplit Ω ΩR ΩG ; Γ |ΩGn G ; Γ |ΩRn Gs ]]
=⇒ Γ | Ω n+1 (G,Gs)
Therefore the judgment relies on the inductive definition of a predicate for order-
preserving splitting of a context. This corresponds to the usual logic programming predicate
append(ΩR,ΩG,Ω ) called with mode append(−,−,+).
=⇒ osplit Ω [ ] Ω
osplit Ω1 Ω2 Ω3 =⇒ osplit (A,Ω1) (A,Ω2) Ω3
The rest of the sequent rules are encoded similarly to the previous SL (Figure 5) and the
details are here omitted (and left to the web appendix of the paper, see hybrid.dsi.unimi.
it/jar). Again we define Γ |Ω G iff there exists an n such that Γ |Ω n G and simply
 G iff [ ] | [ ]G. Similarly for the other judgments.
MC-Theorem 27 (Structural Rules) The following rules are admissible:
– Weakening for numerical bounds:
1. [[ Γ | Ω n G; n < m ]] =⇒ Γ |Ω m G
2. [[ Γ | Ω n Gs; n < m ]] =⇒ Γ | Ω m Gs
3. [[ Γ n Gs; n < m ]] =⇒ Γ m Gs.
– Context weakening, where (set Γ ) denotes the set underlying the context Γ .
1. [[ Γ | Ω G; set Γ ⊆ set Γ ′ ]] =⇒ Γ ′ | Ω G
2. [[ Γ | Ω Gs; set Γ ⊆ set Γ ′ ]] =⇒ Γ ′ | Ω Gs
3. [[ Γ Gs; set Γ ⊆ set Γ ′ ]] =⇒ Γ ′Gs.
– Intuitionistic atomic cut:
1. [[ Γ | Ω i G; set Γ = set (A,Γ ′); Γ ′ | [ ] j 〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ ′ |Ω i+ j G.
2. [[ Γ | Ω i Gs; set Γ = set (A,Γ ′); Γ ′ | [ ] j 〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ ′ | Ω i+ j Gs.
3. [[ Γ i Gs; set Γ = set (A,Γ ′); Γ ′ | [ ] j 〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ ′i+ j Gs.
Proof All the proofs are by mutual structural induction on the three sequents judgments.
For the two forms of weakening, all it takes is a call to Isabelle/HOL’s classical reasoner.
Cut requires a little care in the implicational cases, but nevertheless it does not involve more
then two dozens instructions. ⊓⊔
Although the sequent calculus in [96] enjoys other forms of cut-elimination, the follow-
ing:
MC-Corollary 28 (seq cut)
[[ A,Γ |Ω G; Γ  〈A〉 ]] =⇒ Γ | Ω G
is enough for the sake of the type preservation proof (MC-Theorem 32). Further, admissi-
bility of contraction and exchange for the intuitionistic context is a consequence of context
weakening.
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st init :: init ⋄ return v →֒ answerv
st return :: K;λ x. i ⋄ returnv →֒ K ⋄ i[v/x]
st fun :: K ⋄ ev (funx. e) →֒ K ⋄ return (funx. e)
st fix :: K ⋄ ev (fixx. e) →֒ K ⋄ ev (e[fix x. e/x])
st app :: K ⋄ ev (e1 • e2) →֒ K;λ x1.app1 x1 e2 ⋄ eve1
st app1 :: K ⋄ app1 (funx. e)e2 →֒ K ⋄ ev e[e2/x]
Fig. 9 Transition rules for machine states
5.2 A Continuation Machine and its Operational Semantics
We avail ourselves of the continuation machine for Mini-ML formulated in [91] (Chapters
6.5 and 6.6), which we refer to for motivation and additional details. We use the same lan-
guage and we repeat it here for convenience:
Types τ ::= i | τ → τ ′
Expressions e ::= x | funx. e | e1 • e2 | fixx.e
The main judgment s →֒ s′ (Figure 9) describes how the state of the machine evolves
into a successor state s′ in a small-step style. The machine selects an expression to be ex-
ecuted and a continuation K, which contains all the information required to carry on the
execution. To achieve this we use the notion of instruction, e.g., an intermediate command
that links an expression to its value. The continuation is either empty (init) or it has the form
of a stack (K;λ x. i), each item of which (but the top) is a function from values to instruc-
tions. Instruction (ev e) starts the first step of the computation, while (return v) tells the
current continuation to apply to the top element on the continuation stack the newly found
value. Other instructions sequentialize the evaluation of subexpressions of constructs with
more than one argument; in our language, in the case of application, the second argument is
postponed until the first is evaluated completely. This yields the following categories for the
syntax of the machine:
Instructions i ::= eve | returnv | app1 v1 e2
Continuations K ::= init | K;λ x. i
Machine States s ::= K ⋄ i | answerv
The formulation of the subject reduction property of this machine follows the statement
in [20], although we consider sequences of transitions by taking the reflexive-transitive clo-
sure →֒∗ of the small-step relation, and a top level initialization rule cev (Figure 10). Of
course, we need to add typing judgments for the new syntactic categories, namely instruc-
tions, continuations and states. These can be found in Figure 11, whereas we refer the reader
to Figure 2 as far as typing of expressions goes.
Theorem 29 K ⋄ i →֒∗ answerv and Γ ⊢i i : τ1 and ⊢K K : τ1 → τ2 implies · ⊢e v : τ2.
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stop
s →֒∗ s
s1 →֒ s2 s2 →֒
∗ s3
step
s1 →֒
∗ s3
init ⋄ eve →֒∗ answer v
cev
e
c
→֒ v
Fig. 10 Top level transition rules
Proof By induction on the length of the execution path using inversion properties of the
typing judgments. ⊓⊔
Corollary 30 (Subject Reduction) e c→֒ v and · ⊢e e : τ entails · ⊢e v : τ .
As a matter of fact we could have obtained the same result by showing the soundness
of the operational semantics of the continuation machine w.r.t. big step evaluation, viz. that
e
c
→֒ v entails e ⇓ v (see Theorem 6.25 in [91]) and then appealing to type preservation of the
latter. That would be another interesting case study: the equivalence of the two operational
semantics (thoroughly investigated by Pfenning in Chapter 6 op. cit. but in the intuitionistic
setting of LF), to gauge what the “Olli” approach would buy us.
5.3 Encoding the Object Logic
We now show how to write the operational semantics of the continuation machine as an Olli
program, or more precisely as Olli2։ OL clauses. Rather than representing the continuation
Γ ⊢e e : τ
o f I ev
Γ ⊢i eve : τ
Γ ⊢e v : τ
o f I return
Γ ⊢i return v : τ
Γ ⊢e e1 : τ ′ → τ Γ ⊢e e2 : τ ′
o f I app1
Γ ⊢i app1 e1 e2 : τ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
o f K init
⊢K init : τ → τ
x:τ1 ⊢i i : τ ⊢K K : τ → τ2
o f K cont
⊢K K;λ x. i : τ1 → τ2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⊢i i : τ1 ⊢K K : τ1 → τ2
o f s ⋄
⊢s K ⋄ i : τ2
⊢e v : τ
o f s answer
⊢s answerv : τ
Fig. 11 Typing rules for the continuation machine
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K an explicit stack, we will simply store instructions in the ordered context. This is partic-
ularly striking as we map machine states not into OL data, but OL provability. In particular
we will use the following representation to encode machine states:
K ⋄ i ; [ ] | pKq 〈ex piq〉
where pKq is the representation, described below, of the continuation (stack) K and piq the
obvious representation of the instruction.27 In fact, if we retain the usual abbreviation
uexp == con expr
the encoding of instructions can be simply realized with an Isabelle/HOL datatype, whose
adequacy is standard:
datatype instr = ev uexp | return uexp | app1 uexp uexp
To describe the encoding of continuations, we use our datatype atm, which describes the
atomic formulas of the OL. This time, it is more interesting and consists of:
datatype atm = ceval uexp uexp | ex instr | init uexp
| cont (uexp ⇒ instr) | uexp : tp
| ofI instr tp | ofK tp
We have atoms to describe the initial continuation “init ” of type uexp ⇒ atm, the continu-
ation that simply returns its value. Otherwise K is an ordered context of atoms “cont K” of
type (uexp⇒ instr)⇒ atm. The top level of evaluation (ceval peq pvq) unfolds to the initial
goal init pvq։ ex (ev peq); our program will evaluate the expression peq and instantiate
pvq with the resulting value. In other words, we evaluate e with the initial continuation. The
other instructions are treated as follows: the goal ex (return pvq) means: pass v to the top
continuation on the stack (i.e., the rightmost element in the ordered context): the instruction
in the goal ex (app1 pv1q pe2q) sequentializes the evaluation of application.
We have the following representations of machine states:
init ⋄ returnv ; [ ] | [init W ] 〈ex (return pvq)〉
where the logic variable W will be instantiated to the final answer;
K;λ x. i ⋄ returnv; [ ] | (pKq,cont (λ x.piq)) 〈ex (return pvq)〉
where the ordering constraints force the proof of ex (return pvq) to focus on the rightmost
ordered formula.
We can now give the clauses for the OL deductive systems in Figure 12, starting with
typing. These judgments are intuitionistic, except typing of continuations. The judgments
for expressions and instructions directly encode the corresponding judgments and derivation
rules. The judgments for continuations differ from their analogs in Figure 11 in that there
is no explicit continuation to type; instead, the continuation to be typed is in the ordered
context. Thus, these judgments must first get a continuation from the ordered context and
then proceed to type it.
27 The reader may be relieved to learn that, at this late stage of the paper, we will be much more infor-
mal with the issue of the adequacy of this encoding, mainly trying to convey the general intuition. This is
also notationally signaled by dropping the somewhat heavy notation ε·(·) for the lighter p·q. It is likely that
the faithfulness of our representation could be obtained following the approach in [20]—see in particular
Theorem 3.4 ibid.
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Inductive ←− | :: [atm,oo list,oo list ]⇒ bool
=⇒ (E1 @ E2) :T ←− [ ] | [〈E1 :(T ′ → T )〉,〈E2 :T ′〉]
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ (funx.E x) :(T1 → T2)←− [ ] | [allx.(x :T1) imp 〈(E x) :T2〉]
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ (fix x .E x) :(T )←− [ ] | [allx.(x :T ) imp 〈(E (fix x .E x) :T 〉]
=⇒ ofI (ev E) T ←− [ ] | [〈E :T 〉]
=⇒ ofI (return V ) T ←− [ ] | [〈V :T 〉]
=⇒ ofI (app1 V E) T ←− [ ] | [〈V :(T2 → T )〉,〈E :T2〉]
=⇒ ofK (T → T )←− [〈init V 〉] | [ ]
=⇒ ofK (T1 → T2)←− [〈cont K〉,〈ofK T → T2〉] |
[allx.(x :T1) imp 〈ofI (K x) T 〉]
=⇒ ceval E V ←− [init V ։ ex (ev E)] | [ ]
=⇒ ex (return V )←− [〈init V〉] | [ ]
[[ abstr K ]] =⇒ ex (return V )←− [〈cont K〉,〈ex (K V)〉] | [ ]
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ ex (ev (fun E))←− [〈ex (return (fun E))〉] | [ ]
=⇒ ex (ev (E1 @ E2))←− [cont (λv. app1 v E2)։ 〈ex (ev E1)〉] | [ ]
[[ abstr E ]] =⇒ ex (app1 (fun E) E2)←− [〈ex (ev (E E2))〉] | [ ]
Fig. 12 Hybrid’s encoding of the OL deductive systems of the continuation machine
The evaluation clauses of the program fully take advantage of ordered contexts. The first
one corresponds to the cev rule. The rest directly mirror the machine transition rules.
A sample derivation is probably in order and so it follows as MC-Lemma 31. Note
that as far as examples of evaluations go, this is not far away from total triviality, being
the evaluation of something which is already a value. However, our intention here is not
to illustrate the sequentialization of evaluation steps typical of a continuation machine (for
which we refer again to [91]); rather we aim to emphasize the role of the ordered context, in
particular the effect of non-deterministic splitting on the complexity of proof search.
MC-Lemma 31 ∃V.  〈ceval (funx.x) V 〉
Proof After introducing the logic variable ?V (here we pay no attention to the height of the
derivation) we apply rule bc, i.e., backchaining, obtaining the following 3 goals:
1. ceval (funx.x) ?V ←− [init ?V ։ ex (ev (funx.x))] | [ ]
2. [ ] | [ ] [init ?V ։ ex (ev (funx.x))]
3. [ ] [ ]
Goals such as the third one (the base case of intuitionistic list evaluation) will always arise
when back-chaining on evaluation, as the intuitionistic context plays no role, i.e., it is empty;
since they are trivially true, they will be resolved away without any further mention. So we
have retrieved the body of the relevant clause and passed it to ordered list evaluation:
[ ] | [ ] [init ?V ։ ex (ev (funx.x))]
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This leads to splitting the ordered context, i.e.,
1. osplit [ ] Og Or
2. [ ] | Og init ?V ։ 〈ex (ev (funx.x))〉
3. [ ] | Or [ ]
In this case, ordered splitting is deterministic as it can only match the base case and the two
resulting contexts Og and Or are both set to empty:
[ ] | [ ] init ?V ։ 〈ex (ev (funx.x))〉
The introduction rule for ordered implication (and simplification) puts the goal in the form:
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈ex (ev (funx.x))〉
which corresponds to the execution of the identity function with the initial continuation.
Another backchain yields:
1. abstr (λx. x)
2. osplit [init ?V ] Og1 Or1
3. [ ] | Og1 〈ex (return (funx.x))〉
As usual, abstr tac takes care of the first goal, while now we encounter the first interesting
splitting case. To be able to solve the goal by assumption in the SL, we need to pass the
(singleton) context to the left context Og1. One way to achieve this is to gently push the
system by proving the simple lemma ∃A. osplit [A] [A] [ ]. Using the latter as an introduction
rule for subgoal 2, we get:
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈ex (return (funx.x))〉
More backchaining yields:
[ ] | [init ?V ] [〈init (funx.x)〉]
and with another similar ordered split to the left we have
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈init (funx.x)〉
which is true by the initΩ rule. This concludes the derivation, instantiating ?V with funx.x.
⊓⊔
If we collect in sig def all the definitions pertaining to the signature in question and
bundle up in olli intrs all the introduction rules for the sequent calculus, (ordered) split-
ting and the program database:
fast_tac(claset() addIs olli_intrs
(simpset() addSolver (abstr_solver sig_defs)));
the above tactic will automatically and very quickly prove the above lemma, by backtrack-
ing on all the possible ordered splittings, which are, in the present case, preciously few.
However, this will not be the case for practically any other goal evaluation, since split-
ting is highly non-deterministic in so far as all the possible partitions of the contexts need
to be considered. To remedy this, we could encode a variant of the input-output sequent
calculus described in [96] and further refined in [97], which describes efficient resource
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management—and hence search—in linear logic programming. Then, it would be a matter
of showing it equivalent to the base calculus, which may be far from trivial. In the end, our
system will do fine for its aim, i.e., investigation of the meta-theoretic properties of our case
study.
The example may have shed some light about this peculiarity: the operational semantics
of the continuation machine is small-step; a sequence of transitions are connected (via rules
for its reflexive transitive closure) to compute a value, whereas our implementation looks at
first sight big-step, or, at least, shows no sign of transitive closure. In fact, informally, for
every transition that a machine makes from some state si to si+1, there is a bijective function
that maps the derivation of psiq, i.e., the sequent encoding si to the derivation of psi+1q.
The Olli2։ interpreter essentially simulates the informal trace of the machine obtained by
transitive closure of each step K ⋄ i →֒ s′ for some s′ with a tree of attempts to establish
[ ] | pKq 〈piq〉 by appropriate usage of the available ordered resources (the rest of pKq).
In the above example, the paper and pencil proof is a tree with cev at the root, linked by
the step rule to the st fun and st init axioms. This corresponds to the Olli2։ proof we have
described, whose skeleton consists of the statement of the lemma as root and ending with
the axiom initΩ .
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈ex (ev (funx.x))〉;
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈ex (return (funx.x))〉;
[ ] | [init ?V ] 〈init (funx.x)〉
Now we can address the meta-theory, namely the subject reduction theorem:
MC-Theorem 32 (sub red aux)
[ ] | (init V,Ω ) i 〈ex I〉=⇒
∀T1T2. 〈ofI I T1〉 −→
([ ] | (init V,Ω ) 〈ofK (T1 → T2)〉)−→  〈V :T2〉)
The proof of subject reduction again follows from first principles and does not need any
weakening or substitution lemmas. The proof and proof scripts are considerably more man-
ageable if we first establish some simple facts about typing of various syntax categories and
instruct the system to aggressively apply every deterministic splitting, e.g.,
[[ osplit [ ] Og Or; [[ Og = [ ]; Or = [ ] ]] =⇒ P ]] =⇒ P
as well as a number of elimination rules stating the impossibility of some inversions such as
[[ cont K ←− Ol | Il ]] =⇒ P
The human intervention that is required is limited to providing the correct splitting of the
ordered hypotheses and selecting the correct instantiations of the heights of sub-derivations
in order to apply the IH.
Proof The proof is by complete induction on the height of the derivation of the premise.
The inductive hypothesis is:
∀m. m < n −→
(∀I V Ω .
[ ] | (init V,Ω ) 〈ex I〉 −→
∀T1 T2.
[ ] 〈ofI I T1〉∧
(init V,Ω ) 〈ofK T1 → T2〉 −→  〈V :T2〉)
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Not only we will omit the IH in the following, but we will also gloss over the actual height
of the derivations, hoping that the reader will trust Isabelle/HOL to apply the IH correctly.
We remark that in contexts we overload the comma to denote adjoining an element to a list
at both ends.
We begin by inverting on [ ] | (init V,Ω ) 〈ex I〉 and then on the prog clauses defin-
ing execution, yielding several goals, one for each evaluation clause. The statement for the
st return case is as follows:
[[ . . . ; abstr K;
[ ] | [ ] 〈ofI (return V ′) T1〉;
[ ] | (init V,Ω ) 〈ofK T1 → T2〉;
[ ] | (init V,Ω ) [〈ex (K V ′)〉,〈cont K〉] ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
We start by applying the typing lemma:
[ ] | [ ] 〈ofI (return V ) T〉 =⇒  〈ofI V T 〉
Inverting of the derivation of [ ] | init V,Ω  [〈ex (K V ′)〉,〈cont K〉] yields:
[[ . . . ; osplit (init V,Ω ) Og [cont K];
[ ] | Og 〈ex K V ′〉;
[ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉 ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
Now, there is only one viable splitting of the first premise, where∧
L. [[ osplit Ω L [cont K]; Og = (init V,L) ]] =⇒ P, as the impossibility of the first
one, entailing cont K = init V , is ruled out by the freeness properties of the encoding of
atomic formulas. This results in
[[ . . . ; [ ] | (init V,L) 〈ex K V ′〉;
[ ] | (init V,Ω ) 〈ofK T1 → T2〉;
[ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉;
osplit Ω L [cont K] ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
We now use the reading of ordered split as “reversed” append to force Ω to be the concate-
nation of L and [cont K], denoted here as in the SL logic, e.g. (L,cont K):
[[ . . . ; [ ] | (init V,L) 〈ex K V ′〉;
[ ] | (init V,L,cont K) 〈ofK T1 → T2〉;
[ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉 ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
we now invert on the typing of continuation:
[[ . . . ; [ ] | [ ] [allv.v :T1 imp 〈ofI (K′ v) T 〉];
[ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉;
[ ] | (init V,L,cont K) [〈ofK T → T2〉,〈cont K′〉];
[ ] | (init V,L) 〈ex (K V ′)〉 ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
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The informal proof would require an application of the substitution lemma. Instead here we
use cut to infer:
[ ] | [ ] 〈ofI (K′ V ′) T 〉
We first have to invert on the hypothetical statement allv.v :T1 imp 〈ofI (K′ v) T 〉 and instan-
tiate v with V ′:
[[ . . . ; [ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉;
[ ] | (init V,L) 〈ex (K V ′)〉;
[ ] | (init V,L,cont K) [〈ofK T → T2〉,〈cont K′〉];
[V : ′T1] | [ ] 〈ofI (K′ V ′) T 〉 ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
Now one more inversion on [ ] | (init V,L,cont K) [〈ofK T → T2〉,〈cont K′〉] brings us to
split osplit (init V,L,cont K) Og [cont K′] so that (init V,L) = Og and K = K′:
[[ . . . ; [ ] | [ ] 〈V : ′T1〉;
[ ] | (init V,L) 〈ex (K′ V ′)〉;
[ ] | [ ] 〈ofI (K′ V ′) T 〉;
[ ] | (init V,L) 〈ofK T → T2〉 ]]
=⇒  〈V :T2〉
This final sequent follows from complete induction for height i. ⊓⊔
MC-Corollary 33 (subject reduction) [[  ceval E V ;  E :T ]] =⇒ V :T
6 Related Work
There is nowadays extensive literature on approaches to representing and reasoning about
what we have called “object logics,” where the notion of variable bindings is paramount.
These approaches are supported by implementations in the form of proof checkers, proof
assistants and theorem provers. We will compare our approach to others according to two
categories: whether the system uses different levels for different forms of reasoning and
whether it is relational (i.e., related to proof search) or functional (based on evaluation).
6.1 Two-level, Relational Approaches
Our work started as a way of porting most of the ideas of FOλ ∆ IN [69] into the mainstream of
current proof assistants, so that they can enjoy the facilities and support that such assistants
provide. As mentioned in the introduction, Isabelle/HOL or Coq plays the role of FOλ ∆ IN ,
the introduction/elimination rules of inductive definitions (types) simulate the defR and defL
rules of PIDs and the Hybrid meta-language provides FOλ ∆ IN ’s λ -calculus. In addition,
our approach went beyond FOλ ∆ IN , featuring meta-level induction and co-induction, which
were later proved consistent with the theory of (partial) inductive definitions [82]. These
features are now standard in FOλ ∆ IN ’s successor, Linc [109].
One of the more crucial advances given by Linc-like logic lies in the treatment of induc-
tion over open terms, offered by the proof-theory of [76, 109]. The latter has been recently
modified [110] to simplify the theory of ∇-quantification by removing local contexts of ∇-
bounded variables so as to enjoy properties closer to the fresh quantifier of nominal logic,
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such as strengthening and permutation (see later in this section). Finally the G logic [43]
brings fully together PIDs and ∇-quantification by allowing the latter to occur in the head of
definitions. This gives excellent new expressive power, allowing for example to define the
notion of freshness. Furthermore it eases induction over open terms and even gives a logical
reading to the notion of “regular worlds” that are crucial in the meta-theory of Twelf.
Recently, Linc-like meta-logics and the two-level approach have received a new imple-
mentation from first principles. Firstly, Bedwyr [7] is a model-checker of higher-order speci-
fications, based on a logic programming interpretation of ∇-quantification and case analysis.
Coinductive reasoning is achieved via tabling, although no formal justification of the latter
is given. Typical applications are in process calculi, such as bisimilarity in pi-calculus. The
already cited Abella [42] is emerging a real contender in this category: it implements a large
part of the G logic and sports a significant library of theories, including an elegant proof
of the POPLMARK challenge [6] as well as a proof of strong normalization by logical re-
lations [44], an issue which has been contentious in the theorem proving world. This proof
is based on a notion of arbitrarily cascading substitutions, which shares with nominal logic
encodings the problem that once nominal constants have been introduced, the user often
needs to spend some effort controlling their spread. In fact, there is currently some need to
control occurrences of names in terms and thus to rely on “technical” lemmas that have no
counterpart in the informal proof. This is not a problem of the prover itself, but it is induced
by the nominal flavor that logics such as Linc’s successors LGΩ and G have introduced.
More details can be found in [37].
The so far more established competitor in the two-level relational approach is
Twelf [104]. Here, the LF type theory is used to encode OLs as judgments and to spec-
ify meta-theorems as relations (type families) among them; a logic programming-like in-
terpretation provides an operational semantics to those relations, so that an external check
for totality (incorporating termination, well-modedness, coverage [92,106]) verifies that the
given relation is indeed a realizer for that theorem. In this sense the Twelf totality checker
can be seen to work at a different level than the OL specifications.
Hickey et al. [52] built a theory for two-level reasoning within the MetaPRL system,
based on reflection. A HOAS representation is used at the level of reflected terms. A com-
putationally equivalent de Bruijn representation is also defined. Principles of induction are
automatically generated for a reflected theory, but it is stated that they are difficult to use
interactively because of their size. In fact, there is little experience using the system for
reasoning about OLs.
6.2 Two-level, Functional Approaches
There exists a second approach to reasoning in LF that is built on the idea of devising an
explicit (meta-)meta-logic for reasoning (inductively) about the framework, in a fully auto-
mated way [103]. Mω can be seen as a constructive first-order inductive type theory, whose
quantifiers range over possibly open LF objects over a signature. In this calculus it is pos-
sible to express and inductively prove meta-logical properties of an OL. By the adequacy
of the encoding, the proof of the existence of the appropriate LF object(s) guarantees the
proof of the corresponding object-level property. Mω can be also seen as a dependently-
typed functional programming language, and as such it has been refined first into the Elphin
programming language [107] and finally in Delphin [101]. ATSLF [29] is an instantiation
of Xi’s applied type systems combining programming with proofs and can be used as a
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logical framework. In a similar vein the contextual modal logic of Pientka, Pfenning and
Naneski [83] provides a basis for a different foundation for programming with HOAS based
on hereditary substitutions. This has been explicitly formulated as the programming lan-
guage Beluga [93]. Because all of these systems are programming languages, we refrain
from a deeper discussion. See [35] for a comparison of Twelf, Beluga, and Hybrid on some
benchmark examples.
6.3 One-level, Functional Approaches
Modal λ -calculi were formulated in the early attempts by Schu¨rmann, Despeyroux, and
Pfenning [105] to develop a calculus that allows the combination of HOAS with a primitive
recursion principle in the same framework, while preserving the adequacy of representa-
tions. For every type A there is a type 2A of closed objects of type A. In addition to the
regular function type A ⇒ B, there is a more restricted type A → B≡ 2A ⇒ B of “paramet-
ric” functions. Functions used as arguments for higher-order constructors are of this kind
and thus roughly correspond to our notion of abstraction. The dependently-typed case is
considered in [33] but the approach seems to have been abandoned in view of [83]. Wash-
burn and Weirich [114] show how standard first-class polymorphism can be used instead
of a special modal operator to restrict the function space to “parametric” functions. They
encode and reason about higher-order iteration operators.
We have mentioned earlier the work by Gordon and Melham [47, 48], which we used
as a starting point for Hybrid. Building on this work, Norrish improves the recursion princi-
ples [86], allowing greater flexibility in defining recursive functions on this syntax.
6.4 Other One-Level Approaches
Weak 28 higher-order abstract syntax [32] is an approach that strives to co-exist with an
inductive setting, where the positivity condition for datatypes and hypothetical judgments
must be obeyed. In weak HOAS, the problem of negative occurrences in datatypes is han-
dled by replacing them with a new type. For example, the fun constructor for Mini-ML
introduced in Section 3 has type (var ⇒ uexp) ⇒ uexp, where var is a type of variables,
isomorphic to natural numbers. Validity predicates are required to weed out exotic terms,
stemming from case analysis on the var type, which at times is inconvenient. The approach
is extended to hypothetical judgments by introducing distinct predicates for the negative oc-
currences. Some axioms are needed to reason about hypothetical judgments, to mimic what
is inferred by the cut rule in our architecture. Miculan et al.’s framework [25, 55, 72] em-
braces an axiomatic approach to meta-reasoning with weak HOAS in an inductive setting.
It has been used within Coq, extended with a “theory of contexts” (ToC), which includes
a set of axioms parametric to an HOAS signature. The theory includes the reification of
key properties of names akin to freshness. Exotic terms are avoided by taking the var to be
a parameter and assuming axiomatically the relevant properties. Furthermore, higher-order
induction and recursion schemata on expressions are also assumed. To date, the consistency
with respect to a categorical semantics has been investigated for higher-order logic [16],
rather than w.r.t. a (co)inductive dependent type theory such as the one underlying Coq [46].
28 For the record, the by now standard terminology “weak” HOAS was coined by the second author of the
present paper in [78].
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From our perspective, ToC can be seen as a stepping stone towards Gabbay and Pitts
nominal logic, which aims to be a foundation of programming and reasoning with names,
in a one-level architecture. This framework started as a variant of the Frankel-Mostowski
set theory based on permutations [39], but it is now presented as a first-order theory [94],
which includes primitives for variable renaming and variable freshness, and a (derived) new
“freshness” quantifier. Using this theory, it is possible to prove properties by structural in-
duction and also to define functions by recursion over syntax [95]. The proof-theory of
nominal logic has been thoroughly investigated in [21, 40], and the latter also investigates
the proof-theoretical relationships between the ∇ and the “freshness” quantifier, by provid-
ing a translation of the former to the latter.
Gabbay has tried to implement nominal sets on top of Isabelle [41]. A better approach
has turned out to be Urban et al.’s; namely to engineer a nominal datatype package inside
Isabelle/HOL [85,112] analogous to the standard datatype package but defining equivalence
classes of term constructors. In more recent versions, principles of primitive recursion and
strong induction have been added [111] and many case studies tackled successfully, such as
proofs by logical relations (see [85] for more examples). The approach has also been com-
pared in detail with de Bruijn syntax [13] and in hindsight owes to McKinna and Pollack’s
“nameless” syntax [70]. Nominal logic is beginning to make its way into Coq; see [4].
It is fair to say that while Urban’s nominal package allows the implementation of infor-
mal proofs obeying the Barendregt convention almost literally, a certain number of lemmas
that the convention conveniently hides must still be proved w.r.t. the judgment involved; for
example to choose a fresh atom for an object x, one has to show that x has finite support,
which may be tricky for x of functional type, notwithstanding the aid of general tactics im-
plemented in the package. HOAS, instead, aims to make α-conversion disappear and tries
to extract the abstract higher-order nature of calculi and proofs thereof, rather than follow
line-by-line the informal development. On the other hand, it would be interesting to look at
versions of the freshness quantifier at the SL level, especially for those applications where
the behavior of the OL binder is not faithfully mirrored by HOAS, namely with the tra-
ditional universal quantification at the SL-level; well known examples of this case include
(mis)match in the pi-calculus and closure-conversion in functional programming.
Chlipala [23] recently introduced an alternate axiomatic approach to reasoning with
weak HOAS. Object-level terms are identified as meta-terms belonging to an inductive type
family, where the type of terms is parameterized by the type of variables. Exotic terms are
ruled out by parametricity properties of these polymorphic types. Clever encodings of OLs
are achieved by instantiating these type variables in different ways, allowing data to be
recorded inside object-level variables (a technique borrowed from [114]). Example proofs
developed with this technique include type preservation and semantic preservation of pro-
gram transformations on functional programming languages.
6.5 Hybrid Variants
Some of our own related work has involved alternative versions of Hybrid as well as im-
provements to Hybrid, which we describe here.
Constructive Hybrid. A constructive version of Hybrid implemented in Coq [18] provides
an alternative that could also serve as the basis for a two-level architecture. This version pro-
vides a new approach to defining induction and non-dependent recursion principles aimed at
simplifying reasoning about OLs. In contrast to [107], where built-in primitives are provided
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for the reduction equations for the higher-order case, the recursion principle is defined on
top of the base de Bruijn encoding, and the reduction equations proved as lemmas.
In order to define induction and recursion principles for particular OLs, terms of type
expr are paired with proofs showing that they are in a form that can represent an object-level
term. A dependent type is used to store such pairs; here we omit the details and just call it
expr′, and sometimes oversimplify and equate expr′ with expr. For terms of Mini-ML for
example, in addition to free variables and bound variables, terms of the forms (CON cAPP $
E1 $ E2), (CON cABS $ LAMx.E x) and (CON cFIX $ LAMx.E x), which correspond to
the bodies of the definitions of @, fun, and fix, are the only ones that can be paired with
such a proof. Analogues of the definitions for constructing object-level terms of type expr
are defined for type expr′. For example, (e1@e2) is defined to be the dependent term whose
first component is an application (using @) formed from the first components of e1 and e2,
and whose second component is formed from the proof components of e1 and e2.
Instead of defining a general lambda operator, a version of lbind that does not rely on
classical constructs is defined for each OL. Roughly, (lbind e) is obtained by applying e to
a new free variable and then replacing it with de Bruijn index 0. A new variable for a term e
of type expr ⇒ expr is defined by adding 1 to the maximum index in subterms of the form
(VAR x) in (e(BND 0)). Note that terms that do not satisfy abstr may have a different set of
free variables for every argument, but for those which do satisfy abstr, choosing (BND 0)
as the argument to which e is applied does give an authentic free variable. Replacing free
variable (VAR n) in (e(VAR n)) with (BND 0) involves defining a substitution operator that
increases bound indices as appropriate as it descends through ABS operators. This descrip-
tion of lbind is informal and hides the fact that these definitions are actually given on depen-
dent pairs, i.e., e has type expr′ → expr′. Thus, the definition of lbind depends on the OL
because expr′ is defined for each OL. Induction and recursion are also defined directly on
type expr′. To obtain a recursion principle, it is shown that for any type t, a function f of
type expr′ → t can be defined by specifying its results on each “constructor” of the OL. For
example, for the @ and fun cases of Mini-ML, defining f involves defining Happ and Hfun
of the following types:
Happ : expr′ → expr′ → B→ B→ B
Hfun : (expr′ → expr′)→ B → B
and then the following reduction equations hold.
f (e1@e2) = Happe1 e2 (f e1) (f e2)
f (fun λx. f x) = Hfun(canon(λx. f x)) (f (lbind (λx. f x)))
In these equations we oversimplify, showing functions f, Happ, and Hfun applied to terms
of type expr; in the actual equations, proofs paired with terms on the left are used to build
proofs of terms appearing on the right. The canon function in the equation for fun uses
another substitution operator to obtain a “canonical form,” computed by replacing de Bruijn
index 0 in (lbind (λx. f x)) with x. This function is the identity function on terms that satisfy
abstr.
Another version of constructive Hybrid [17] in Coq has been proposed, in which theo-
rems such as induction and recursion principles are proved once at a general level, and then
can be applied directly to each OL. An OL is specified by a signature, which can include sets
of sorts, operation names, and even built-in typing rules. A signature specifies the binding
structure of the operators, and the recursion and induction principles are formulated directly
on the higher-order syntax.
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Hybrid 0.2. During the write-up of this report, the infrastructure of Hybrid has developed
significantly, thanks to the work by Alan Martin (see [80]), so that we informally talk of
Hybrid 0.2. Because those changes have been recent and only relatively influence the two-
level approach, we have decided not to update the whole paper, but mention here the relevant
differences.
The main improvement concerns an overall reorganization of the infrastructure de-
scribed in Section 2, based on the internalization as a type of the set of proper terms. Using
Isabelle/HOL’s typedef mechanism, the type prpr is defined as a bijective image of the set
{s : : expr | level0s}, with inverse bijections expr : : prpr ⇒ expr and prpr : : expr ⇒ prpr. In
effect, typedef makes prpr a subtype of expr, but since Isabelle/HOL’s type system does not
have subtyping, the conversion function must be explicit. Now that OL terms can only be
well-formed de Bruijn terms, we can replace the proper abst property (MC-Lemma 3) with
the new lemma
MC-Lemma 34 (abstr const)
abstr (λ v. t :: prpr)
From the standpoint of two-level reasoning this lemma allows us to dispose of all proper
assumptions: in particular the SL universal quantification has type (prpr ⇒ oo)⇒ oo and
the relative SL clause (Figure 5) becomes:
[[ ∀x. Γ n (G x) ]] =⇒ Γ n+1 (allx.G x)
Therefore, in the proof of MC-Lemma 23 no proper assumptions are generated. The proof of
OL Subject Reduction (MC-Theorem 24) does not need to appeal to property (3) or, more
importantly, to part 1 of MC-Lemma 14. While this is helpful, it does not eliminate the
need for adding well-formedness annotations in OL judgments for the sake of establishing
adequacy of the encoding.
Further, a structural definition of abstraction allows us to state the crucial quasi-
injectivity property of the Hybrid binder LAM, strengthening MC-Theorem 4 by requiring
only one of e and f to satisfy this condition (instead of both), thus simplifying the elimina-
tion rules for inductively defined OL judgments:
MC-Theorem 35 (strong lambda inject)
abstr e =⇒ (LAMx.ex = LAMy. f y) = (e = f )
The new definition allows us to drop abstr tac for plain Isabelle/HOL simplification, and
the same applies, a fortiori to proper tac.
A significant case study using this infrastructure has being tackled by Alan Martin
[64, 65] and consists of an investigation of the meta-theory of a functional programming
language with references using a variety of approaches, culminating with the usage of a lin-
early ordered SL. This study extends the work in Section 5 and [81], as well as offering a
different encoding of Mini-ML with references than the one analyzed with a linear logical
framework [20].29
Martin’s forthcoming doctoral thesis [64] also illustrates that it is possible to use alter-
nate techniques for induction at the SL level. Instead of natural number induction, some
proofs of the case study are carried out by structural induction on the definition of the SL. In
29 We remark that this approach seems to be exempt from the problems connected to verifying meta-
theoretical sub-structural properties in LF-style, as pointed out in [102].
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these proofs, it was necessary to strengthen the desired properties to properties of arbitrary
sequents, and to define specialized weakening operators for contexts along with lemmas
supporting reasoning in such contexts. It is not clear how well this technique generalizes;
this is the subject of future work. In another technique, natural numbers are replaced by
ordinals in the definition of the SL, and natural number induction is replaced by transfinite
induction. This technique is quite general and simplifies proofs by induction that involve
relating the proof height of one derivation in the SL to one or more others.
Induction over Open Terms In this paper’s examples, proofs by induction over derivations
were always on closed judgment such as evaluation, be it encoded as a direct inductive def-
inition at the meta-level or as prog clauses used by the SL. In both cases, this judgment was
encoded without the use of hypothetical and parametric judgments, and thus induction was
over closed terms, although we essentially used case analysis on open terms. Inducting over
open terms and hypothetical judgments is a challenge that has required major theoretical
work [43,103]. Statements have to be generalized to non-empty contexts, and these contexts
have to be of a certain form, which must enforce the property in question. In [37] we showed
how to accomplish this in Hybrid with only a surprisingly minimal amount of additional in-
frastructure: we can use the VAR constructor to encode free variables of OLs, and simply
add a definition (newvar) that provides the capability of creating a variable which is fresh,
in particular w.r.t. a context. We express the induction hypothesis as a “context invariant,”
which is a property that must be preserved when adding a fresh variable to the context. The
general infrastructure we build is designed so that it is straightforward to express context in-
variants and prove that they are preserved when adding a fresh variable. Very little overhead
is required, namely a small library of simple lemmas, where no reasoning about substitu-
tion or α-conversion is needed as in first-order approaches. Yet the reasoning power of the
system and the class of properties that can be proved is significantly increased.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a multi-level architecture that allows reasoning about objects encoded
using HOAS in well-known systems such as Isabelle/HOL and Coq that implement well-
understood logics. The support for reasoning includes induction and co-induction as well as
various forms of automation available in such systems such as tactical-style reasoning and
decision procedures. We have presented several examples of its use, including an arguably
innovative case study. As we have demonstrated, there are a variety of advantages of this
kind of approach:
– It is possible to replicate in a well-understood and interactive setting the style of proof
used in systems such as Linc designed specially for reasoning using higher-order encod-
ings. The reasoning can be done in such a way that theorems such as subject reduction
proofs are proven without “technical” lemmas foreign to the mathematics of the prob-
lem.
– Results about the intermediate layer of specification logics, such as cut elimination, are
proven once and for all; in fact it is possible to work with different specification logics
without changing the infrastructure.
– It is possible to use this architecture as a way of “fast prototyping” HOAS logical frame-
works since we can quickly implement and experiment with a potentially interesting SL,
rather than building a new system from scratch.
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Since our architecture is based on a very small set of theories that definitionally builds
an HOAS meta-language on top of a standard proof-assistant, this allows us to do without
any axiomatic assumptions, in particular freeness of HOAS constructors and extensionality
properties at higher-order types, which in our setting are now theorems. Furthermore, we
have shown that mixing of meta-level and OL specifications make proofs more easily mech-
anizable. Finally, by the simple reason that the Hybrid system sits on top of Isabelle/HOL
or Coq, we benefit from the higher degree of automation of the latter.
Some of our current and future work will concentrate on the practical side, such as con-
tinuing the development and the testing of the new infrastructure to which we have referred
as Hybrid 0.2 (see Section 6.5 and [80]), especially to exploit the new features offered by
Isabelle/HOL 2010. Further, we envisage developing a package similar in spirit to Urban’s
nominal datatype package for Isabelle/HOL [85]. For Hybrid, such a package would auto-
matically supply a variety of support from a user specification of an OL, such as validity
predicates like isterm, a series of theorems expressing freeness of the constructors of such
a type including injectivity and clash theorems, and an induction principle on the shape of
expressions analogous to MC-Theorem 6. To work at two levels, such a package would in-
clude a number of pre-compiled SLs (including cut-elimination proofs and other properties)
as well as some lightweight tactics to help with two-level inference. Ideally, the output of
the package could be in itself generated by a tool such as OTT ( [108]) so as to exploit the
tool’s capabilities of supporting work on large programming language definitions, where
“the scale makes it hard to keep a definition internally consistent, and hard to keep a tight
correspondence between a definition and implementations”, op. cit.
We clearly need to explore how general our techniques for induction over open terms
[37] are, both by attempting other typical case studies such as the POPLMark challenge or
the Church-Rosser theorem, as well as analyzing the relationship with theoretical counter-
part such as the regular world assumptions and context invariants in Abella. This may also
have the benefit of a better understanding and “popularization” of proofs in those less known
frameworks. In Twelf, in particular, much of the work in constructing proofs is currently
handled by an external check for properties such as termination and coverage [92, 106]. We
are investigating Hybrid as the target of a sort of “compilation” of such proofs into the well-
understood higher-order logic of Isabelle/HOL. More in-depth comparisons with nominal
logic ideas such as freshness and the Gabbay-Pitts quantifier are also in order. In fact, any
concrete representation of bound variables does not fit well with HOAS, where the former
have no independent identities. However, there are relevant applications (e.g., mismatch in
the pi-calculus, see [22] for other examples) where names of bound variables do matter.
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